Chapter 3

The Second Supercycle 1775-1815

Revolutions which were counter-revolutionary, and counter-revolutionaries who were revolutionary; innovations which were wholly revanchist, and revanchisms which were astonishingly innovative; defeats more successful than any victory, and victories more disastrous than any defeat; empires which spawned democracies, and democracies which spawned empires – whatever metric one chooses, the four decades between 1775 and 1815 embody a torrent of contradictions without precedent in world history.

Above all, the second supercycle witnessed the dramatic acceleration of historical time. The American revolution shrank centuries into decades, while the Napoleonic era compressed decades into years. The French revolution's clarion call for liberty, fraternity and equality proclaimed that history was on the march, while its magnificent answering chorale – the Haitian revolution, the Caribbean and Eastern European slave and serf insurrections, and the South American insurrections of 1810-1815 – proved that history would never slow down again.

This acceleration of time was accompanied by an equally momentous transformation of space. Whereas the battles of the first supercycle were limited to a comparatively small region in Central Europe and the maritime colonies of the Atlantic, the battles of the second took place across four oceans and on extensive swathes of five continents. Caught between the hammer of anti-colonial revolution and the anvil of planetary war, provinces became realms, realms became empires, while empires occasionally disintegrated into provinces. The conflicts of the second supercycle ultimately embroiled ten out of the existing eleven super-empires of 1775, with only the Qing empire remaining militarily uninvolved (although its economy did play an important role in the eventual outcome).

The geopolitical consequences of these conflicts were as unprecedented as their scale. Two continents of independent polities emerged from the wreckage of four maritime colonial empires, in the form of the United States, Haiti, and the South American republics. At the same time, two of the super-empires of 1775 – those of Britain and Russia – rose significantly in geopolitical status. Brushing off the loss of its thirteen American colonies, the British empire became the economic, cultural and political hegemon of the 19th century world-system, while the Russian empire became the military (though not the economic or cultural) co-hegemon of continental Europe. Three other super-empires – those of Austria, the Ottomans and the Qing – survived the wars of the second supercycle and retained their position as leading powers.

On the losing side of the ledger, three super-empires – those of the Dutch, the French, and the Spanish – lost the bulk of their maritime colonies during the conflict, although all three retained their status as autonomous polities. At the same time, the Marathan and Mughal super-empires of South Asia disappeared from the map completely, their territory annexed by the British empire.

The second supercycle did more than reorganize polities and borders. It spurred fundamental changes in the nature of political governance. Traditions of hieratic obeisance and sectarian fealty began to give way to civic patriotism and national affinity, the values of
nobilitarian honor and hieratic obligation began to accede to those of national service and civic virtue, while the rule of monarchs and nobilitarian elites began to give way to the rule of constitutions and the owners of capital.

Perhaps the single most significant political innovation of the second supercycle, one whose consequences would reverberate well into the middle of the 19th century, was the inauguration of the mass insurrection of wageless and partly waged workers. While pockets of fully waged workers located in the northern American colonies, Britain, Belgium and the United Provinces played an important supporting role in these insurrections, especially in the areas of ideology and communication, their numbers were small compared to the total number of wageless and partly waged workers. As a result, the success or failure of these insurrections depended largely on the degree to which wageless and partly waged laborers could unite in cross-class alliances with politically mobilized fully waged workers, and act in conjunction with sympathetic factions of capitalist merchants, financiers and small-scale entrepreneurs.

This underlying constellation helps to explain why the major geopolitical events of the second supercycle follow a characteristic pattern. This pattern is a boundless radicalism of form, combined with an equally boundless revanchism of content. Nowhere is the pattern more evident than in the so-called “bourgeois revolutions” of the 1770s and 1780s, which were neither especially bourgeois nor particularly revolutionary. Rather, they were popular insurrections which unleashed a wide range of revolutionary as well as counter-revolutionary forces.

Since these forces were not yet fully anchored in fully-formed nation-states, national political institutions, or national economies, their political struggles had a curiously dissociated or weightless aspect, almost as if superstructural ideologies were battling in a void without the mediation of underlying economic infrastructures. With every fresh crisis, it seemed everything was about to change – and for that very reason, almost nothing changed at all.

One of the reasons for the discord between revolutionary aspirations and conservative realities was the key institutional innovation of the second supercycle. This was the emergence of national imperialisms backed by national debt markets. The seemingly boundless political possibilities of the anti-colonial and national mass movements of the era were sharply constrained by the economic limitations of these national imperialisms.

Put more concretely, the anti-colonial national mass movements of the epoch were dependent on unstable cross-class alliances between wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers on the one hand, and capitalist and colonial elites on the other. In North America, an alliance of Boston's wealthy mercantile elites and its plebian commoners rose up against British rule between 1773 and 1775. During the 1790s, dissident networks of Afro-British and African American sailors at sea and in port cities spread the news of the French revolution throughout the Caribbean, helping to ignite the Haitian revolution as well as numerous other island insurrections. In France, an alliance of radical Jacobins and plebian sans-culottes transformed a nobilitarian uprising into a national revolution. In South America, an alliance of radicalized clergy such as Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla and José María Morelos, colonial merchants, and disaffected soldiers of the Spanish empire launched the 1810 Mexican revolution, while an alliance of criollo elites and urban crowds triggered Colombia's revolution in the legendary “flower vase incident” of Bogota in 1810.

Conversely, these alliances disintegrated whenever the interests of their underlying classes diverged. Merchant elites and fully waged laborers could always agree on ending
subsidies to hieratic and nobilitarian elites, but could never agree on lowering wages. Similarly, a section of capitalist elites could agree with wageless and partly waged laborers on the need to abolish wageless labor and thereby increase the supply of fully waged labor, while another section of capitalist elites furiously resisted this abolition as a restraint on trade. While many partly and fully waged laborers supported the abolition of wageless labor, some fully waged laborers supported regimes of racial and gender exclusion which kept wageless and partly waged laborers from becoming potential competitors on the labor market.

This pattern of external radicalism and internal revanchism is clearly expressed in the hegemonic political texts of the epoch. The first hegemonic document of national citizenship, the US Declaration of Independence (1776), roundly condemned the predations of the British monarchy, but discreetly avoided the subject of chattel slavery. The best-selling pamphlet of revolutionary mass nationalism, Thomas Paine's Common Sense (1776), offered a magnificent defense of representative democracy, but uttered not a word about the indentured or the enslaved. The first explicitly national constitution, the Constitution of the United States (1787), enshrined numerous political and juridical freedoms while legitimating the electoral despotism of the southern slave-owners.

By contrast, the genuinely radical mass movements and political texts of the second supercycle negated the conventionality of their external forms by means of a scandalous internal dynamism. Olaudah Equiano's Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano (1789) transformed the novelic genres of the bildungsroman, the travel adventure, and the religious conversion into the first classic abolitionist autobiography. Similarly, Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) transformed the national political pamphlet, the moral essay, and the argument for popular suffrage into the founding document of modern feminism. Robert Coram's Political Inquiries (1791) fused the nascent fields of sociology, anthropology and economics into a coherent policy argument for public education for all. There is also the belated transformation of Thomas Paine from prophet of continental land-imperialism to prophet of the national welfare state. Radicalized by his first-hand participation of the French revolution, Paine's Agrarian Justice (1795) eschewed the rhetorical excesses of his earlier work in favor of a pragmatic meditation on the necessity of sharing the nation's economic wealth.

This pattern of external convention and internal innovation is especially prominent in the leading aesthetic works of the second supercycle, where it takes the guise of the antagonism between dynamic forms with static content, and static forms with dynamic content. In the visual field, Jacques-Louis David's The Death of Marat (1793) combines the nobilitarian portrait with the energy of the front-page newspaper photo, while Napoleon Crossing the Alps (1802) fuses the battlefield commemoration of the absolutist monarch with the mass appeal of the modern propaganda poster.

In the realm of the novel, Jane Austen's six great works (1811-1817) reappropriate the 18th century marriage-plot to showcase the class struggles between male gentry capitalists and female partly waged domestic laborers (the gamut from the housewife to the governess). This labor does not simply consist of housework and childcare, but also consists of the work of maintaining kinship structures and social obligations. The radical sting of Austen's satire is that bourgeois sentimentality is nothing but partly waged labor. Austen's achievement is paralleled to a limited extent by the lyric innovations of English Romanticism, most notably the first two cantos of Byron's Childe Harold (1810-1811). This
latter invents the trope of Byronic masculinity, the ultimate lyrical expression of an iambic imperial populism punctuated by nobilitarian alexandrines. The masculinity of this imperial populism is far more ambivalent than Austen's proto-feminism, since it can underwrite abolitionism just as easily as the enlightened despotism of the English East India Company.

In addition to these political and cultural innovations, the second supercycle also generated a number of economic innovations which would shape the world economy for centuries to come. Almost all of these innovations occurred in Britain, and include the invention of Samuel Crompton's spinning mule (1775 to 1779), the invention and refinement of James Watt's steam engine (1781 to 1784), the take-off of the British textile industry in the 1780s, the adoption of coal as a primary energy source in the 1790s, and the transformation of British sovereign debt into a world reserve currency in the 1800s.

To be sure, Britain's victory in the second supercycle was based on more than just simple economic superiority. It was the combination of innumerable political, cultural and economic changes which refashioned British culture, politics and economics into the hegemonic institutions of the 19th century. The complex and multifaceted nature of this hegemony should compel us to think more carefully and concretely about the institutional basis of the British empire, and how these institutions did not simply compete against those of other empires, but also cooperated with and to a certain extent even fostered the latter.

Consider the emergence of the Russian empire from peripheral status to the military co-hegemon of continental Europe (the other being Britain) after 1815. Russia's co-hegemony was always limited for the simple reason that it was primarily demographic and military in nature, and not backed by cultural influence or economic dynamism. What needs to be explained is why Russia's version of dynastic expansionism ultimately complemented rather than undercut British hegemony.

Similar questions need to be asked about the resilience of the Austrian, Ottoman and Qing empires during this period. The Austrian empire recovered from numerous battlefield reverses to annex part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and eventually played a leading diplomatic role in the Concert of Europe. Conversely, the Ottoman empire was not seriously damaged by Napoleon's 1798 incursion into Egypt and retained control over most of southeastern Europe and northern Africa. The Qing empire remained the preeminent power of continental East Asia, and restricted the influence of British and French maritime traders via the treaty port system until 1839.

There is a comparable paradox at work in the trajectories of the Dutch, French, Portuguese and Spanish empires. All four polities lost significant territory and colonial possessions during the second supercycle or its immediate aftermath. However, the British empire not only safeguarded the political autonomy of these four empires, but allowed them to rule over diminished versions of their former realms. Britain conquered Sri Lanka and South Africa from the Dutch in 1796 and 1803, respectively, but returned Indonesia to Dutch rule in 1816. France had to return its Napoleonic-era territorial conquests, but was not partitioned or unduly constrained by the terms of the Congress of Vienna. Just fifteen years after the end of the Napoleonic era, France was allowed to construct its second colonial empire, albeit one based in Africa and Southeast Asia rather than the Americas. The Portuguese empire lost control over its Brazilian colony in 1822, but retained its grip over Angola and Mozambique. Finally, a much-
diminished Spanish empire continued to reign over Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico until the end of the 19th century.

Even the two apparent exceptions to the general pattern of imperial continuity, namely the dissolution of the Marathan and Mughal empires, prove the rule. The English East India Company (EIC) did not abolish the institutional underpinnings of Marathan and Mughal rule, namely the dominion of land-owners or zamindars over local peasantries and the domination of local mercantile traders or banias over regional networks of trade. It absorbed both into its administrative machinery. One of the most striking paradoxes of this process was that the EIC’s successful expansionism was crucial to forging Britain's military victories over Napoleon in continental Europe, a paradox we will unravel in the pages to come.

Last but not least, we must explain why the second supercycle ushered in the rise of two new regional powers, both of which would profoundly alter the trajectory of the 19th century and indeed the course of world history. These powers were Prussia and the United States, the seedbeds of the post-1871 German empire and the post-1865 American empire, respectively.

In addition to explaining why these geopolitical outcomes occurred, we must also explain why other geopolitical outcomes, although equally plausible in theory, did not materialize. Why did Britain ascend to hegemony whereas France did not, given that France had three times the British population, a vast colonial empire, and massive capitalist wealth accumulation in its own right? Why was Britain able to conquer fifty million South Asians, but unable to subdue two million American colonists? On a longer time-scale, why were the mercantile and dynastic expansionisms of the Dutch-French epoch surpassed by British national imperial capitalism at precisely this moment? Was the British victory predestined from the beginning, or was it the product of sheer luck?

Indeed, one of the most puzzling aspects of the second supercycle is the seeming improbability of Britain's victory when considered from the standpoint of 1775. Whereas the Hapsburg empire displayed copious symptoms of imperial overstretch as early as the 1590s, there was never any comparable moment of crisis for the Dutch-French co-hegemony. Although the Dutch empire was no longer the world's leading naval power after the 1730s, it retained immense wealth and functioned as the largest capital market of Europe until the mid-1790s. Conversely, the loss of France's North American territories after 1763 did not change the fact that its land armies and demographic base remained the most formidable in Europe. France also retained the advantages of a long-standing alliance with the Bourbon-led Spanish empire, the preeminent colonial power of the Americas. Finally, France continued to extract massive wealth from half a million Caribbean wageless laborers as late as 1790.

By contrast, the British empire lost vast amounts of territory and wealth during its fruitless eight year war (1775-1783) against the thirteen American colonies, and the naval battles it fought against the combined Dutch, French and Spanish fleets between 1778 and 1783 were inconclusive. In spite of the economic disruption caused by the French and Haitian revolutions, France remained the single largest economy on the planet and fielded the single most powerful army on the planet until close to the end of the Napoleonic era.

To explain the British victory, we must first reexamine the outbreak of the American revolution. At first glance, this revolution might seem to be the most bourgeois of all the early national revolutions, in the sense that it began as the rising of small-scale merchants, shopkeepers and capitalist farmers against the forces of a retrograde semi-feudalism.
Yet from our own 21st century perspective, what is most striking about the American revolution is not its rhetorical radicalism, but its institutional conservativism. Far from founding a new society, the rebellious colonists were defending a very old empire. The founding of Jamestown, Virginia, the English empire's first colony in the Americas, occurred in 1607, one hundred and sixty eight years prior to the American revolution. As we shall see, the most important reason the American colonists united against British rule was not outrage at arbitrary British taxation, but the prospect of acquiring sole control over the vast new lands of the western frontier.

The colonists' motivation will become less mysterious if we consider the American revolution in the context of its four closest analogues – the Patriot uprising in the United Provinces (1780-1787), the French revolution (1789), the Brabant uprising (1790) of Belgium, and the Haitian revolution (1791). The Patriot uprising was quelled, but signaled the rise of a merchant class chafing under the rule of rentier oligarchs. The French revolution proclaimed the doctrine of human rights and temporarily abolished slavery, before transmuting into Napoleonic imperialism. The Brabant revolution was defeated, but signaled the rise of the Belgian national independence struggle. Finally, the Haitian revolution emancipated half a million human beings from slavery, defeated the counter-revolutionary interventions of three empires, and established the first independent Caribbean republic, before relapsing into history's first postcolonial despotism.

All four of these revolutions witnessed ferocious factional struggles within ruling elites, as well as significant challenges from mass urban uprisings and peasant rebellions. By contrast, the American revolution was characterized by remarkable political continuity. American merchant and planter elites established a Continental Congress in 1774, raised a national army in 1775, and began conducting bilateral negotiations with Britain's main competitors, France and the United Provinces, in 1776. In spite of the British occupation of the major American port cities, numerous military defeats, and significant economic hardships, the Congress retained unchallenged political authority over the thirteen colonies as well as over its armed forces.

There was no significant attempt to abolish American slavery during the revolutionary period or immediately thereafter, markedly few changes were made to existing systems of colonial governance by the new nation-state, and the original 1787 Constitution did not guarantee national suffrage or even basic human rights (these had to be added later, in the form of the Bill of Rights). Where England became the world's first constitutional monarchy in 1689, the United States become the world's first constitutional oligarchy in 1787.

According to the best guess of contemporary historians, perhaps forty percent of the colonial population overtly supported independence, while perhaps ten percent were opposed. Given that the population of partly waged and fully waged colonists amounted to 1.8 million, this meant that 720,000 colonists supported independence and 180,000 did not, with at least 900,000 remaining largely neutral. This raises the question of why the British empire failed to crush a rebellion whose demographic base was only one tenth the size of the British population, which had no significant navy, and which was heavily dependent on British markets.

The solution to the mystery is that 1775 was not a single national revolution, so much as a set of three interconnected regional uprisings. A highly organized political uprising detonated in the northern colonies, a less organized uprising of sovereignty occurred in the central colonies, while a diffuse land acquisition uprising took place in the southern colonies. The key triggers for
each of these uprisings were the populations of the four main port cities, which were also the largest urban settlements in the colonies. For the northern colonies, these port cities were Boston (population 15,000) and New York (population 20,000). For the central colonies, the key city was Philadelphia (population 40,000). For the southern colonies, the key city was Charleston (population 7,000).

The political uprising was centered in the northern colonies of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island. These seven colonies had a combined population of about 859,000, or two-fifths of the entire colonial population. They were the wealthiest of the three regions, with an economy characterized by high degrees of literacy, small-scale capitalist farming, and the widespread adoption of fully waged craft labor and the occasional use of partly waged or indentured labor. It was also a region with a long tradition of town meetings, contested elections, an independent press, and other forms of mass political participation. While the economy of the northern colonies imported significant quantities of goods from Britain, its rural communities were self-sustaining and not unduly dependent on the Atlantic triangular trade. Finally, the cities of New York and Boston served as key intellectual centers of the uprising. Boston, despite its small size of only 15,000 inhabitants, was especially important as an incubator of dissident movements ranging from the Sons of Liberty to the Committees of Correspondence.

By contrast, the uprising took on a more diffuse form in the central colonies. These consisted of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware and had a combined population of 475,000, or about one-fifth of the total colonial population. Its economy was based primarily on partly waged and fully waged labor, with the significant exception of Maryland, whose population of 200,000 was probably one-third wageless laborers (i.e. enslaved). Maryland's plantation economy depended on exporting agrarian goods to British markets, which meant that its planters were less enthusiastic about separation from the mother country. In addition, Pennsylvania's 250,000 inhabitants contained large numbers of Dutch and German-speaking immigrants, which made the task of revolutionary political mobilization more challenging.

On the other hand, Pennsylvania contained the city of Philadelphia, the largest in the colony with 40,000 inhabitants. As a polity, Pennsylvania had one of the highest rates of urbanization in the world of 1775. Philadelphia was also the site of one of the most significant print cultures of the colonies, e.g. Benjamin Franklin's printing press. On the whole, the central colonies remained steadfast supporters of independence, and Philadelphia would serve as the main headquarters of the Continental Congress for most of the revolutionary war.

The uprising of the southern colonies – those of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, with a combined population of 846,000 or two fifths of the colonial total – represents the greatest paradox of all. Their economies were dominated by wageless and partly waged labor, which made them heavily dependent on exports to British markets. Forty percent of their population were wageless laborers who were mostly excluded from direct political participation in the revolution, although some participated in covert ways. Yet in striking contrast to the plantocracies of the Caribbean, the American plantocracy was broadly in favor of independence. Some of its most prominent figures, e.g. Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, played crucial roles in the independence struggle.

What united all three uprisings was land expansionism. The merchants of the northern colonies saw the opportunity to annex Canada and expand its Atlantic trade, Pennsylvania's
magnates dreamed of settling the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, while the planters of the southern colonies were hungry for fresh supplies of land to grow soil-depleting cotton and tobacco.

The prehistory of this land expansionism can be traced back to the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, when increased rates of British taxation triggered several waves of protest by the heretofore lightly-taxed colonists. These protests ranged from petitions denouncing the 1764 Sugar Act, to a national congress of colonial delegates called in protest against the 1765 Stamp Act. Delegates from Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and South Carolina met in New York City, anticipating the continental scale of the national congresses to come.

In 1767, the Townshend Acts sparked unrest in Boston, resulting in near-riots and the seizure of a ship owned by wealthy Boston merchant and future revolutionary John Hancock. This was followed by the deployment of British troops in Boston, and then by another near-riot which triggered the Boston Massacre of 1770. The British authorities temporarily defused the crisis by quarantining their soldiers at Castle William, and by partly repealing the levies on the colonists. The final warning sign was the 1772 Gaspee affair, when a crowd of colonists seized and burnt a British customs schooner charged with seizing contraband from colonial ships.9

However, the singular political event which finally united the northern, central and southern colonies did not occur until December 16, 1773. Seven months prior to this event, the British parliament passed the Tea Act of May 10, 1773, granting the English East Indies Company an official monopoly on the sale of tea in America. This outraged colonial American merchants, who organized a successful boycott of the unloading of EIC tea in the southern American port of Charleston, the central port of Philadelphia, and the northern ports of Boston and New York.

This coordinated action already showed two key characteristics of American colonial elites. First, they had an efficient worldwide information network, thanks to the dense network of American and British merchant ships which plied the major oceanic trade routes of the mid-18th century. This network enabled American elites to trade extensively (albeit illicitly) with the Dutch, French, Portuguese and Spanish empires, to take advantage of opportunities for global arbitrage much as British, Dutch and French elites had done, and to exploit rivalries between competing imperial powers. Second, these elites understood the crucial importance of Britain's merchant fleet and the EIC in underwriting the British economy and in projecting British geopolitical power.

The boycott was successful in Charleston, New York and Philadelphia. However, the royal governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, refused to allow the three ships carrying EIC tea to leave Boston harbor without paying the required parliamentary duty. Hutchinson had long been an unpopular figure among Boston's political dissidents, but his decision was the proverbial spark which ignited a firestorm.

On November 29, 1773, long-time Boston politician Samuel Adams called for a town meeting on the matter at Boston's Faneuil Hall.10 Eyewitnesses estimated the crowd at between five to seven thousand, an extraordinary turnout considering Boston's entire population was approximately 15,000 at this time. Due to the massive size of the crowd, the gathering was relocated to the more capacious quarters of Boston's Old South Meeting House.11 After a series of meetings which roundly denounced Hutchinson and the Tea Act, a small group of conspirators boarded the three ships and dumped a small fortune of EIC tea into the ocean. John Adams,
Samuel's second cousin and fellow dissident, described the political significance of the event with remarkable prescience in his December 17, 1773 diary entry:

Last Night 3 Cargoes of Bohea Tea were emptied into the Sea. This Morning a Man of War sails. This is the most magnificent Movement of all. There is a Dignity, a Majesty, a Sublimity, in this last Effort of the Patriots, that I greatly admire. The People should never rise, without doing something to be remembered – something notable And striking. This Destruction of the Tea is so bold, so daring, so firm, intrepid and inflexible, and it must have so important Consequences, and so lasting, that I cant but consider it as an Epocha in History.

... The Question is whether the Destruction of this Tea was necessary? I apprehend it was absolutely and indispensably so. – They could not send it back, the Governor, Admiral and Collector and Comptroller would not suffer it. It was in their Power to have saved it – but in no other. It could not get by the Castle, the Men of War &c. Then there was no other Alternative but to destroy it or let it be landed. To let it be landed, would be giving up the Principle of Taxation by Parliamentary Authority, against which the Continent have struggled for 10 years, it was loosing all our labour for 10 years and subjecting ourselves and our Posterity forever to Egyptian Taskmasters – to Burthens, Indignities, to Ignominy, Reproach and Contempt, to Desolation and Oppression, to Poverty and Servitude.  

The Boston Tea Party was a brilliant act of political theater. It destroyed replaceable property instead of irreplaceable lives, it targeted the profits of the EIC rather than those of innocent merchants, it showcased the power of oceanic trade to generate economic wealth, and it politicized the nascent consumer culture of the era. Thanks in large part to the Tea Party and various revolutionary-era boycotts, most Americans switched from “bohea” tea (the name of the most common variety) to coffee.

Above all, the Tea Party goaded the British authorities into making the fatal mistake of passing the four Coercive Acts of 1774. The most egregious of these was the Boston Port Act, which closed the port until such time as the destroyed tea was paid for (reputedly £6,000 in 1773 prices) and order restored. This collective punishment was a direct assault on the long-standing freedom of American merchants to trade, and catalyzed popular support for independence to a degree beyond even the most fervent dissident's imagination. The result was a wave of popular mobilization, as villages and towns formed militias, stockpiled weapons, and sent delegates to the first Continental Congress on September 4, 1774.

What needs to be explained, however, is why the merchants and planters of the central and southern colonies were equally enraged by the Coercive Acts and quickly joined the northern insurrection. After all, they were not directly affected by the closure of Boston's port, and they were far more dependent on access to British markets. Nor is the explanation of British political intransigence entirely convincing. As late as July 1775, the British parliament offered the colonists clemency in the form of the Olive Branch Petition, which essentially gave in completely to the colonists' economic demands in exchange for continued fealty to the crown.

The secret of the triple insurrection is contained in two crucial words Adams uses which would become leitmotifs of the American revolution: “people” and “continent”. What occurred in 1773 was that the ten-year struggle against arbitrary taxation finally turned into a struggle for
something else. This something was the possibility of continental-sized land acquisition. In the ringing cadences of Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*:

"Tis not the affair of a city, a county, a province, or a kingdom; but of a continent – of at least one eighth part of the habitable globe. "Tis not the concern of a day, a year or an age; posterity are virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected even to the end of time, by the proceedings now. Now is the seed-time of continental union, faith and honor. The least fracture now will be like a name engraved on the point of a pin on the tender rind of a young oak; the wound would enlarge with the tree, and posterity read it in full grown characters.¹⁴

This continental union was that of property owners, this continental faith was the belief in future property values, and this continental honor consisted of secure land titles. Paine himself is not to be blamed for the fact that the newly-planted Liberty Tree would be chopped down to furnish the timber for a continental-sized auction block.¹⁵ Yet what made the prospect of continental unity so irresistible to American merchants and planters, and so appealing to hundreds of thousands of small farmers, fully waged workers and literate partly waged workers, was not the abstraction of democracy for all but the tangible opportunity of land for everyone.

It should be remembered that rates of male suffrage in the colonial-era American colonies were far higher as a percent of the entire population than their British equivalent. Since the main qualification for voting in the colonies was land ownership, the comparatively high rate of land ownership among American colonists and low levels of poll taxes enabled approximately three-fifths of adult white males to vote in the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary United States, as compared to suffrage rates of perhaps 15% of adult males in late 18th century Britain.¹⁶ Put bluntly, where the Dutch revolt of 1568 began as a sectarian conflict over confessional obligations, and whereas the English civil war of 1642-1652 began as a nobilitarian conflict over taxation, the three loosely coordinated American insurrections began as the biggest real estate speculation in world history.

What transformed this real estate speculation into a continental-sized, eight-year war was the subsequent struggle between two opposing forces. These forces were the imperial aspirations of merchant and planter elites, and the economic aspirations of fully waged, partly waged and wageless laborers. On October 21, 1775, these abstract imperial aspirations begin to turn into the specifics of imperial management, as John Adams describes how the members of the Continental Congress discussed the economic basis of the British empire, its dependence on trade, the crucial role of Britain's navy, and the importance of constructing an American navy.¹⁷ The Congress was literally crafting a new empire by carefully studying and modifying the institutional innovations of an older one.

A year later, the Continental Congress put its findings into practice, by issuing the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, one of the most ingenious documents of imperial ideology ever created. This declaration established two core principles for all future national imperialisms. First, the Congress transformed dynastic expansionism into settler expansionism. In the words of the concluding sentence of the Declaration of Independence: “And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.”¹⁸ The biggest real
estate speculation in world history was now backed by the collateral of its merchant and planter elites.

It is true that the landless, the moneyless, the indentured and women – in other words, a sizable majority of the American adult population – were excluded from the initial round of this real estate speculation. Yet this did not lessen the ideological power of land expansionism one iota. The existence of widespread land ownership among American white males, as well as small groups of African American males, predisposed large numbers of wageless, partly waged and fully waged workers to look favorably on the project of American independence.

The second core principle established by the Declaration was blanket hostility towards any other authority or empire which might impinge upon or restrict the colonists’ agenda of unlimited land acquisition. The Congress declared itself to be acting against a pervasive, all-encompassing despotism, never mind the fact that the colonies had been lightly taxed and loosely regulated for centuries. In the Declaration, this despotism is caricatured as the sole responsibility of a single entity, namely the personage of the British monarch. The open despotism of imperial capital establishes itself by openly denouncing the capital of the imperialist despot.

More is at stake here than the tactical shrewdness of denouncing the British crown while leaving the door open to negotiations with the British parliament. The Declaration ritually condemns the monarch to what Orlando Patterson would call a social death, just as the Puritans would condemn James I and the French revolutionaries would condemn Louis XVI to physical death. Where the Puritans sought religious liberty and ended up with the despotism of Cromwell, and where the French revolutionaries sought political liberty and ended up with the despotism of Napoleon, the American insurgents sought to create a continent of liberty and ended up creating a continental despotism of real estate hucksters.

This continental despotism is only half of the revolutionary story. The economic aspirations of laboring commoners generated powerful forms of structural dissidence which were as antagonistic to the British empire as they were to the nascent American empire. One of the most useful frameworks to understand this dissidence is not the French, Haitian or South American revolutions which followed the American revolution, but the English Puritan revolution which preceded it. Just as the true English radicals of the mid-17th century were neither parliamentarians nor monarchists, but rather dissenters such as the Levelers and Diggers who employed the discourse of the Reformation to wage class war against England's landed elites, the true radicals of the American revolution were located at some distance from the merchant and planter elites of the Continental Congress.

These radicals countered the continental speculation of the real estate hucksters with the utopia of oceanic circulation. Their key agents were Linebaugh and Rediker’s “motley crew” of dissident Atlantic sailors, commoners, and enslaved. In port cities and warehouses, on board ships of war and merchant sloops, on slave plantations and yeoman farms, on maroon settlements and in barracoons, the motley crew invented new forms of cultural political and economic solidarity between wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers:

By energizing and leading the movement from below, the motley crew shaped the social, organizational and intellectual histories of the era and demonstrated that the American Revolution was neither an elite nor a national event, since its genesis, process, outcome, and influence all depended on the circulation of proletarian experience around the Atlantic. That circulation would continue into the 1780s, as the veterans
of the revolutionary movement in America carried their knowledge and experience to the eastern Atlantic, initiating pan-Africanism, advancing abolitionism, and assisting in the revival of dormant traditions of revolutionary thought and action in England and, more broadly, in Europe. The motley crew would help to break apart the first British empire and to inaugurate the Atlantic's age of revolution.19

The simultaneous rise of the American empire and the Atlantic radicalisms had the most profound consequences on the British empire imaginable. We will argue the United States was the first of four crucial counterplayers (the others were the Haitian revolution, the South Asian Mughal and Marathan empires, and the Napoleonic empire) necessary to forge the economic and military infrastructures of British hegemony, precisely where the main branches of the Atlantic radicalisms (the movements and campaigns for the abolition of wageless labor, for universal male and female suffrage, and for public education and other public services) were the crucial counterplayers required to forge the political and cultural instruments of British hegemony.

To understand this dynamic, we must first examine the historical necessity of the British defeat in the American war. This defeat was inevitable not just because of the battle of Yorktown or the diplomatic success of the Continental Congress in building an anti-British coalition of France, Spain and the United Provinces, though these latter certainly played a role. The real reason was that this was a war the Americans simply could not lose.

There were four good reason for this. First, whereas Britain dominated the seas and could control the major port cities along the American coastline, ninety-five percent of the colonists lived in self-sufficient farming communities invulnerable to naval blockade. Second, the colonial population had very high rates of natural growth and was approximately one-quarter the size of its British equivalent in 1775, giving the revolutionists a sufficiently large demographic base to hold off British expeditionary forces. Third, the wind-powered sailing technology of the day meant that sending and maintaining large numbers of troops across the Atlantic ocean was excruciatingly expensive for the British state (due to cost constraints, the entire British occupation force never numbered more than 60,000, whereas the insurgents could field an army of roughly 40,000 for an indefinite amount of time). All three British disadvantages were compounded by the fact that the American insurgents were spread across vast spaces, were self-sufficient in food and most supplies, and could also retreat when necessary into a virtually infinite frontier.

Fourth, Britain was still not the world's economic or military hegemon in 1775. This meant that while American merchants and planters did suffer from the temporary loss of British markets, they could easily switch to the markets of the Dutch, French, Portuguese and Spanish empires, including the maritime empires of these latter in the Caribbean and South America. Over the short term, these alternative trade links enabled the Americans to obtain the saltpeter and muskets they needed to continue fighting the British. Over the long term, they allowed the Americans to assemble a coalition of the Dutch, French and Spanish navies against the British fleet.

These four factors meant that the only military force capable of quelling the colonials would have been the colonials themselves, i.e. a pro-monarchy faction. This faction never emerged, for the simple reason that the American colonies had well-developed systems of governance which continued to function on the state and local level during the entire conflict, and because the British authorities never offered a compelling political vision to the large
numbers of colonists who did not necessarily support independence, but saw reason to actively contest such.

As a result, every single short-term or tactical success of the British authorities only served to exacerbate their long-term or strategic defeat. The basic model for this dynamic was established by the outbreak of open hostilities near Lexington, Massachusetts on April 19, 1775. British forces began to march through the Massachusetts countryside, intending to seize the colonists' military supplies stored at Concord. Thanks to efficient intelligence gathering and information networks, the Massachusetts militia mobilized and forced the British soldiers to withdraw under fire. Similarly, the naval-led occupations of Boston and New York did nothing to stop American merchants from smuggling their goods from other points along the vast American coastline, but did ensure that the radical dissidents of both cities would now spread across the rest of the colonies to rally for the revolutionary cause.

During the first years of the war, well-trained British expeditionary forces could defeat the ill-equipped American continents in open battle with relative ease. However, they could never hold significant amounts of territory, nor could they win back the loyalty of the local population. Nor could British soldiers easily unleash indiscriminate violence against an English-speaking population which was culturally and socially virtually identical to themselves. Non-English speaking mercenaries might have deployed such violence, but they were expensive to recruit and maintain, and British officers shied away from using such tactics.

This allowed the continental army to improve its tactics and training over time, and to counter Britain's initial advantages in logistics and firepower with superior mobility and local knowledge of terrain (these latter resulted in the American victories at Fort Ticonderoga in 1775 and Trenton in 1777). It also allowed the insurgents to secure the assistance of powerful foreign allies between 1778 and 1783. The vast expense of waging the American war on land, the inability to defeat the capacity and willingness of the continentals to fight, the inability of British naval forces to dominate the oceans, and the defeat of the British expeditionary force at Yorktown eventually convinced Britain's elites to cut their losses and recognize American independence.20

Yet the single most important result of the American revolutionary war was not the brief check it dealt to British imperial expansionism, a check more than compensated for by the dramatic intensification of American imperial expansionism. Rather, it was the powerful impetus it gave to a new set of economic, political and cultural struggles in the world-system. These struggles had been developing in fits and starts over the course of the Dutch-French long peace, but did not become key motors of history until the second supercycle.

These struggles are best understood as two concurrent contests, one overt and the other covert in nature. The overt struggle was the contest waged between various imperial capitalisms over continental and ultimately world hegemony. The covert struggle was the contest of emergent oceanic radicalisms (the North American, Caribbean and northwest European radicalisms of the 1780s and 1790s, and the South American radicalisms of the 1800s and 1810s) against emergent national capitalisms. To paraphrase Pierre Bourdieu and Fredric Jameson, the field of the first is the realm of geopolitics and its habitus is national imperialism, while the field of the second is the realm of class struggle and its habitus is the geopolitical unconscious.

The concept of the geopolitical unconscious is a rewriting of Freud's theory of the psychic division of labor, as well as Fredric Jameson's theory that the US culture-industry...
expresses the contradictions of early neoliberal or transnational capitalism. Where Freud limited his analysis to the psychological contradictions of the upper middle class Viennese subjects of the Austrian empire, the geopolitical unconscious expands this to include the social, political and cultural contradictions of the various contending classes of the capitalist world-system. Conversely, where Jameson focused exclusively on the era of US hegemony, the geopolitical unconscious includes everything from the Hapsburg, Dutch-French, and British hegemonies to the concept of supercycles, and from the regional hegemonies of the super-empires to the sub-hegemonies of the postcolonial nation-states.

As a concept, the geopolitical unconscious is meant to highlight a dynamic contradiction rather than a static condition. This contradiction is the distance between the individual subjectivities of wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers, and their potential collective consciousness as a class. More precisely, it is the distance between the vast, inchoate spectrum of aesthetic impressions, political innervations, and conceptual insights of these workers, divided by occupation, education, geography, ethnicity, language, imperial polity, and relative position in the world-system, and the forms of cultural solidarity and collective political participation available to them at any given moment.

The trajectory of the American revolution is a prime example of the explanatory power of the geopolitical unconscious. In the course of the revolution, military conflicts expanded from hundreds to thousands of kilometers of space, while naval operations expanded from small-scale battles off the coast of western Europe to large-scale battles in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. The human price tag of this transformation was equally unprecedented, as total casualties for all sides of the conflict were well over one hundred thousand human beings.

Yet what made this vast expansion of the battlefield possible was not a logistical revolution, but a revolution of consciousness. The local and regional identities of the thirteen colonies were reforged during the eight-year war into a truly national identity, everywhere from the esprit de corps of the quarter of a million American colonials who served in the continental army to the cultural and economic support for independence by millions of civilians. What this new national identity could not know about itself is that its fundamental premise, the utopia of land-expansionism for all, was based on imperialism and violence: the freedom the colonized won from the colonizers was the freedom to become colonizers in their own right. Nor was any other historical outcome possible at that time, given the geopolitical reality that the postcolonial United States was economically dependent on an emergent British empire on the cusp of world hegemony.

These contradictions are on prominent display in the single most representative document of the newly independent nation, namely the 1789 US Constitution. The main political function of the latter was to reconcile the aspirations of the original three American insurrections, namely the desire of the northern merchants for additional markets, the desire of the real estate speculators of the central colonies for land worked by settler colonists, and the desire of the southern planters for land worked by wageless laborers. To achieve this, the framers of the Constitution reconfigured three regional expansionisms into a single national imperialism.

This imperial project was powered by two main engines. The first was the financialization of the various settler colonialisms of the northern and central states, while the second was the financialization of the wageless labor of the southern states. This is the root of the notorious three-fifths compromise which counted each wageless laborer as three-fifths of a
voter for purposes of national representation and taxation. Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the US Constitution reads:

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.

Indentured laborers and indigenous Americans are counted as citizens, while wageless laborers are banished to the indeterminate void of “all other persons”. Akhil Reed explains how this seemingly minor clause transformed the bodies of wageless laborers into a gigantic speculation on future national political capital:

Virginia emerged as the big winner – the California of the Founding era – with 12 out of a total of 91 electoral votes allocated by the Philadelphia Constitution, more than a quarter of the 46 needed to win an election in the first round. After the 1800 census, Wilson’s free state of Pennsylvania had 10% more free persons than Virginia, but got 20% fewer electoral votes. Perversely, the more slaves Virginia (or any other slave state) bought or bred, the more electoral votes it would receive. Were a slave state to free any blacks who then moved North, the state could actually lose electoral votes.

If the system’s pro-slavery tilt was not overwhelmingly obvious when the Constitution was ratified, it quickly became so. For 32 of the Constitution’s first 36 years, a white slaveholding Virginian occupied the presidency.

The four slave-owners from Virginia who served as President between 1789 and 1825 were George Washington (1789-1797), Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), James Madison (1809-1817) and James Monroe (1817-1825). All served two terms, and each played a key role in expanding the early US empire. Washington served as the military commander of the revolutionary army and its founding President, Jefferson was responsible for the Louisiana Purchase, Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, while Monroe expanded US imperial power overseas in the form of the Monroe Doctrine.

The sole intermissions to this parade of Virginian rulers were the Massachusetts family dynasty of John Adams (1797-1801) and his son, John Quincy Adams (1825-1829), and the latter was only selected because of a political compromise following a badly split electoral vote. John Quincy Adams was followed by the two Presidencies of slave-owner Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), who was based in Tennessee rather than Virginia. The last of the slave-owning Virginian Presidents in US history, and the only slave-owning President to serve one instead of two terms, was John Tyler (1841-1845). He was followed by one-term President James Polk (1845-1849), a slave-owner based in Tennessee. The very last US President to own slaves while in office was Kentucky-based Zachary Taylor, who served only a single year (1849-1850). All told, southern slave-owners controlled the US Presidency for 45 out of the nation’s first 61 years, i.e. three out of every four years between 1789 and 1850.
In addition to dominating the office of the Presidency, the plantocracy wielded unassailable power within Congress as well. By 1810, the southern states controlled 12 seats in the Senate, compared to 16 for the northern states and 8 for the central states. Since Maryland still had large numbers of wageless laborers, the plantocrats effectively had 14 senators, or about two-fifths of the Senate. Out of 143 seats in the House of Representatives, 56 belonged to slave states in 1812, while nine belonged to Maryland, effectively a state slave, which increased the voting power of the plantocracy to 45% of the House.

The twin economic engines of early US imperial expansion, namely land imperialism in the north and slave imperialism in the south, extracted a vast surplus from the partly and fully waged laborers of the northern and central states, and an equally impressive surplus from the wageless and partly waged laborers of the south states. Part of this surplus was retained by local farmers, entrepreneurs and planters, resulting in significant demographic and economic growth. Part was mobilized to fuel fresh land speculations, generating new markets and new polities. Vermont became the fourteenth American state on March 4, 1791, Kentucky became the fifteenth on June 1, 1792, Tennessee became the sixteenth on June 1, 1796, and Ohio became the seventeenth on March 1, 1803. Only nine years after Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana territory from Napoleonic France in 1803, Louisiana became the eighteenth state on April 30, 1812. While wageless labor began to decline in the central states after 1790, the two economic engines of the US empire remained roughly equal in terms of their shares of US economic and political power as late as 1810:

Table 1. Early expansion of the US empire by regional population (population of wageless laborers in brackets), 1790-1810.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1790</th>
<th>1800</th>
<th>1810</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern colonies (Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont after 1791)</td>
<td>1.45 million (wageless 2.5%)</td>
<td>2.03 million (wageless 1.8%)</td>
<td>2.68 million (wageless 1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central colonies (Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio after 1803)</td>
<td>0.81 million (wageless 14.2%)</td>
<td>1.01 million (wageless 11.3%)</td>
<td>1.49 million (wageless 7.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern colonies (Georgia, Kentucky after 1792, Louisiana after 1812, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee after 1796, Virginia)</td>
<td>1.42 million (wageless 37%)</td>
<td>2.12 million (wageless 34.5%)</td>
<td>2.77 million (wageless 35.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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One of the paradoxes of the early US empire was that its political separation from Britain was not yet backed by full economic independence. It is true that America's post-1790 economic expansion did give rise to the beginnings of a national financial sector. While the US stock market was not officially founded as an institution until 1817, in practice it existed in the form of
the Buttonwood Agreement, an exclusive trading pact signed by twenty-four brokers on May 17, 1792. These brokers established the Tontine Coffeehouse in lower Manhattan in 1793, where they traded the government debt of the US, the publicly-held First Bank of the United States, and shares of the privately-held Bank of New York.25

The other significant economic innovation of the early US empire was the financialization of wageless labor. Bonnie Martin has shown that mortgages on chattel slaves were a major source of financial wealth and collateral for economic activity throughout the southern states.26 These mortgages undoubtedly helped to spur the early 19th century industrialization of the northern American states, in much the same way that the serf mortgages of the Russian heartland indirectly spurred the industrialization of the Russian empire's Baltic, Belarusian, Polish and Ukrainian colonial territories in the mid-19th century.27

In spite of these financial innovations, the US economy as a whole remained dependent on imports of British finance, technology and manufactured goods until the middle of the 19th century. We will analyze the precise role played by northern US fully waged and southern US wageless labor in the context of the British long peace in the next chapter. For now, however, we must turn to the covert part of our four-sided struggle, namely the story of how the American revolution generated new types of class struggle as well as a new kind of geopolitical unconscious.

We noted previously that this revolution ultimately succeeded thanks to a cross-class alliance between continental merchants, land speculators, planters on the one hand, and skilled workers, yeoman farmers and indentured laborers on the other. The success of this revolution transformed the intermittent and often concealed class struggles of the Dutch-French era – the simmering conflicts between peasants and lords, between craftworkers and their nobilitarian patrons, and between dynastic and hieratic orders – into overt and continuous contestation. Put bluntly, the struggle over nobilitarian fealty began to be supplanted by the struggle over democratic legitimacy.

The clearest sign of this struggle for legitimacy was the disintegration of the cross-class alliance of the revolutionary years into two antagonistic class projects. These projects were those of US elites who were no longer nobilitarian or mercantile oligarchs, but not quite a fully capitalist ruling elite, and those of US crowds who were no longer an urban mob, but not quite a fully industrial proletariat. What is most intriguing about these class projects is that while they were clearly national in scale, their contradictions were just as clearly transnational in scope.

In the sphere of politics, US elites pursued the goal of constitutional oligarchy, whereas US crowds pursued the goal of constitutional democracy. US elites replaced the Articles of Confederation with the US Constitution in 1789, established the hegemony of creditors over debtors, and generated vast profits from US land expansionism. Conversely, the American crowd pursued the goals of freedom from all forms of indenture, share-cropping, debt bondage, as well as the freedom to own land and to cast votes. These two opposing projects could mostly agree on national independence from the British empire and further imperial expansion at the expense of indigenous American peoples, but most disagreed on the issues of debt bondage and universal suffrage.

The realm of economics contained a sharper and even more explosive contradiction. The two main economic goals of US elites were imperial land acquisition for maximum profit, and lower wages (including the expansion of wageless labor). The two main economic goals of US
crowds were access to farmland for self-preservation, and higher wages. While both projects could more or less agree on the further acquisition of land at the expense of indigenous Americans, they could never agree on the expansion of wageless labor. Wageless labor generated vast profits for elites, but represented an existential threat to the livelihood of partly and fully waged laborers, because these latter could not compete against commodities produced at zero labor cost. The most fundamental economic conflict of the first seventy years of the American empire was between the drive by its elites to expand the realm of wageless labor, and the drive by its crowds to expand the realm of fully waged labor.  

It was this conflict which shaped the geopolitical unconscious of the second supercycle – that is to say, the proto-political mass movements of US, Caribbean, British, French and South American wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers not yet organized into national proletariats. The most spectacular form of this unconscious was the near-simultaneous emergence of abolitionism and suffragism. Abolitionism was the first instance of transnational solidarity between the class project of wageless laborers and those of partly waged and fully waged laborers, while the struggles for female and universal male suffrage were the first instance of transnational solidarity between partly waged (primarily though not exclusively female) and fully waged (primarily though not exclusively male) laborers. Both movements were as inherently transnational as the three major systems of wageless labor they resisted, i.e. chattel slavery in the Americas, serfdom in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and indenture in Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean and South Asia.

One of the most striking signs of the emergence of the geopolitical unconscious is the transformation of abolition and suffrage from comparatively minor political issues in the 1770s (e.g. Thomas Paine's first denunciation of slavery was published in 1775, while the state of Vermont abolished slavery in 1777, but neither posed a significant challenge to the southern planters) into major and permanent features of the political landscape in the 1780s. Back in 1772, Somersett's Case established a precedent in British jurisprudence that chattel servitude was illegal on the home territory of the United Kingdom. However, there were almost no immediate consequences of this decision. Between 1776 and 1783, both the continentals and the British engaged in the selective recruitment of African American soldiers, but neither side linked this tactic to a long-term strategy of abolition.

What made the 1780s truly different was the first planetary wave of politics from below. To paraphrase Linebaugh and Rediker's terminology, the 1780s marked the moment the storm of the Atlantic radicalisms became continental flesh. An unprecedented number of mass uprisings detonated across an equally unprecedented expanse of the Atlantic sub-system of the larger world-system, connecting regions and populations previously separated by geography, ethnicity, language and imperial dominion. The explicit goal of these uprisings was the planetary abolition of wageless labor in all its forms, ranging from American chattel slavery to Eastern European and Eurasian serfdom, and from Caribbean indenture to South Asian and Southeast Asian servitude.

The clearest signal of the shift from the covert resistances of the 1770s to the overt insurrections of the 1780s was the Tupac Amaru uprising of Peru (1780-1781). Although quickly crushed by the colonial authorities, the uprising anticipated the multiracial and cross-class coalitions which would power the successful revolutions of the South American republics during 1810-1824. In Eastern Europe, major uprisings of serfs occurred in Czechia in 1780, and in
Poland’s Silesia and Hungary’s Transylvania in 1784, the overture of eight decades of legal and illegal struggles to abolish serfdom. Still further to the east, the long-quiescent Sejm (parliament) of the partly-dismembered Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth stirred into near-revolutionary activity, passing a raft of legislation for a national army and other state-building reforms between 1788 and 1790. In 1781, wageless laborers Elizabeth Freeman and Quock Walker sued in the court of Massachusetts with the help of abolitionist-minded lawyers for their freedom. Their claim was based on the fact that the 1780 Massachusetts state constitution guaranteed liberty for all citizens. They won their respective cases, signaling the full-scale emergence of abolitionism in the US nine years before Benjamin Franklin’s landmark abolitionist petition to the first US Congress in 1790.

The revolutionary wave reached Britain on June 17, 1783, when Cecil Wray presented the very first abolitionist petition to the British parliament. Just three years later, a group of twelve British citizens (nine Quakers and three Anglicans, one of whom was William Wilberforce) established the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787, one of the key organizations of British abolitionism. Two years later, the Governor General of Bengal proclaimed the banning of the export of slaves from British-controlled territory on July 22, 1789, while the Madras Presidency issued a similar proclamation on March 8, 1790. While these proclamations did nothing to halt the flow of indentured laborers from South Asia or the predations of the East India Company, they illustrate the fact that certain parts of the British imperial state were compelled to make tactical compromises with the class project of wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers.

The capstone of the first wave of Atlantic uprisings was the Haitian revolution of 1791, the epochal event which detonated a series of epic slave insurrections across the Caribbean over the next fifteen years. We will example the specific constellation of the Haitian revolution more closely in the pages to come, but for now it is worth noting that the diplomatic representatives of the Haitian revolution in Paris were crucial in convincing the French Legislative Assembly to vote to abolish slavery on April 4, 1792. One month later, the Danish monarchy officially abolished the slave trade. The very next year, the legislature of Upper Canada, the predecessor of the eventual Canadian province of Ontario, passed the 1793 Act Against Slavery.

More importantly, the Atlantic uprisings generated a number of innovative political institutions and practices which continue to flourish to this day. For example, the Atlantic radicalisms invented the issue-based sociological research study, in the form of Thomas Clarkson’s mass interviews of hundreds of sailors associated with the slave trade, and his careful documentation of the coercive violence of the Middle Passage. These radicalisms also invented the modern human rights campaign, in the form of abolitionist speeches and the slave testimonial narrative, cf. Equiano’s 1789 autobiography. Finally, they were crucial in transforming the nobilitarian petition for royal clemency into the democratic demand for parliamentary action. Kenneth Morgan describes how abolitionist petition campaigns generated an unprecedented level of mass political participation between between 1787 and 1792:

It has been estimated, for example, that between 1787 and 1792 petitions against the slave trade were signed by 1.5 million out of 12 million people in Britain (almost one-sixth the total population). In the 1791-2 parliamentary session alone, no fewer than 519 abolitionist petitions were presented to the Commons from all over the nation.
Some of the most remarkable achievements of the Atlantic uprisings were not directly political or economic in nature, but theoretical and cultural. Many of these works emerged at some distance from the imperial heartlands of Britain and France, the two main contestants for hegemony in the second supercycle. This tendency was most evident in the German-speaking region, where the second supercycle witnessed a remarkable flowering in the fields of theater, philosophy and music.

In theater, this period of accelerated innovation encompasses Goethold Lessing's *Nathan the Wise* (1779), the first didactic play of German theater; Friedrich Schiller's *Don Carlos* (1787), the first German national historical drama; Schiller's subsequent *William Tell* (1804), the first drama of the Swiss national revolution; and finally Goethe's *Faust, Part I* (1808), the first drama of the Napoleonic national imperial speculation.

An even more radical shift occurred in philosophy, where Kant and Hegel transcended the limits of Spinoza's century-old system of rationalism by critiquing Spinoza's identification of the principle of the rational choice as the exclusive property of the rational subject – or put more bluntly, the assertion that the market transaction equals the value of the commodity. Instead, Kant's *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) argued that rationality functioned as the a priori grounds or absolute precondition of subjectivity. This meant that market transactions could diverge from their underlying values, because each is determined by a separate set of objective preconditions (the community of buyers versus those of the sellers). It is the task of ascertaining these underlying values that leads Kant to the philosophical innovation of the thing in itself (“Ding an sich”), the ur-form of the Marxian commodity.

Kant's insight was rooted in his lifelong residency in Prussia's Königsberg (contemporary Kaliningrad), a port city which had centuries of experience with the Baltic trade networks of the Dutch-French epoch. While this geopolitical location enabled Kant to theorize the power of what Marx would term late 18th century circulation-capital – the unequal exchange of Eastern European agricultural goods for British, Dutch and French handicraft manufactures – it did not generate any insight into the realm of consumption or production. It is not surprising that Kant's subsequent works, *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and *The Critique of Judgement* (1790), attempted to anchor the absolute precondition and the objective thing in itself in the operation of the individual aesthetic and critical judgement, that is to say, in a problematic meta-rationality not yet backed by a coherent national legislature, a national aesthetic canon, or a national juridical sphere. This meta-rationality is a provincial lawfulness which has not yet become national law.

Hegel's crucial contribution here was to name this meta-rationality or absolute precondition as the national speculation it indeed was. The Hegelian system thus moved from the market subject (the speculative thesis which Kant expressed as historical form, but could not quite grasp as historical content), to the market object or critical antithesis, and finally to the sublation of both in the Hegelian synthesis – the speculation which nets a profit. Conversely, the conceptual limits of the Hegelian system are the economic limits of this speculation.

This is why Marx's cutting comment that Hegel's dialectic was upside down, i.e. ascends overhastily from the concrete to the ideal, is far more perceptive than one might think. Marx's point is that Hegel names the antithesis, but does not actually carry it out. Instead of negating the
thesis, this latter is elevated to the status of the synthesis by fiat (first by Napoleon's world-soul, and later by the Prussian state). The Hegelian system is thus a radicalized conservativism, wherein the rational reigns over the real, but does not truly rule over such, in much the same way that the Napoleonic empire reigned over its conquered territories, but did not truly control their economies.

This contradiction gives rise to one of the most striking paradoxes of the Hegelian system. This is its incomparable ability to explain everything in the historical continuum, except the existence of historical ruptures or radical change. This paradox is inextricably linked to Hegel's lack of a theory of aesthetics. Hegel's bald assertion that the real is the rational means that there can be nothing real which is not already rational. This automatically excludes any aesthetic material which might dissent from, critique, or negate the existent. Hegel's conservativism is not a bug in his system, it is its most salient feature.

Paradoxically, it was not in the fields of German-speaking theater or philosophy, institutions structurally vulnerable to state censorship, but rather the field of Austrian music where artists could express their solidarity with the oceanic radicalisms most openly. Charles Rosen has provided one the most insightful accounts of the revolutionary nature of the works of the First Viennese School, a.k.a. Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven, arguing that Mozart's greatest works showcase exquisite melodies, a.k.a. musical subjects, against a backdrop of ornate cadences or musical objects which are themselves the reconciliation of minor dissonances with major harmonies. They are the musical equivalent of the reconciliation of Benjamin Franklin's individual pluck with the decorum of the Austrian court. What is new revivifies that which is old, while what is old restabilizes that which is new.

In a passage analyzing Mozart's K271 Concerto in E flat for Piano (1777), Rosen describes how the concerto is transformed from a nobilitarian-provincial form into a plebian-national one, inaugurating an aesthetic revolution as far-reaching in its musical consequences as the Kantian transcendence of Spinozan rationalism was for philosophy:

What shall we term this matter of creation, freedom or submission to rules? Eccentricity or classical restraint? License or decorum? With a sense of proportion and dramatic fitness unsurpassed by any other composer, Mozart bound himself only by the rules he reset and reformulated anew for each work. His concertos are not ingenious combinations of traditional concerto-form with the more modern sonata allegro, but independent creations based on traditional expectations of the contrast between solo and orchestra reshaped with an eye to the dramatic possibilities of the genre, and governed by the proportions and tensions – not the patterns – of sonata style. We shall arrive only at a misunderstanding, more or less serious depending on the work, if we try to impose the form of a Mozart concerto from outside the work without considering the dramatic intention and the directional thrust of the material. Above all, we must remember that it is not the themes of the work – or the motifs – that form the material, but their ordering and their relation: a ‘development’ is not merely a development of themes, but takes into account, intensifies – ‘develops’, in short – the order and the sense of what has gone before. It is the exposition as a whole that is developed, not the individual motifs.38

Mozart balances the dissonant energies of the US revolutionary crowd with the consonance of Austria's comparatively benevolent dynastic rule – benevolent, to be sure, only
because it was falling behind Britain, the Netherlands and France in the competition for new colonies. Lacking the resources to expand into Central Europe or to directly challenge the Russian or Ottoman empires, Austrian elites chose to invest in music halls instead of sugar colonies.

Put another way, Mozart's concertos relate to Beethoven's symphonies very much as the national assemblies of the 1770s and 1780s relate to the national legislatures of the 1800s and 1810s. “Mozart's most fantastic strokes,” notes Rosen in one of his most perceptive asides, “are always his most reasonable.” Conversely, Beethoven's most grandiose syntheses are always his musically most realistic. In Rosen's words: “It is typical of Beethoven that his largest works should also be the most economical.”

Both composers resolve the otherwise irreconcilable tensions between past agrarianism and future industrialism, past nobilitarianism and future democratization, and past dynastic expansionism and future national-imperial expansionism through radical innovations of musical form. These innovations express the logic of the proto-national musical audiences crucial to Mozart's invention of the national concerto and Beethoven's invention of the national symphony, respectively. We will return to Beethoven's specific achievements later in this chapter, but for now it is worth pondering Rosen's description of the social subtext of the tonic major and minor in Mozart's K503 Piano Concerto No. 25 in C Major (1786):

> The central and insistent opposition and synthesis of major and minor is remarkable for its long-range conception. It means that the bass generally remains absolutely stable against the continuous tensions of the harmony, often with the immobility of a pedal-point. Since the major-minor contrast occurs immediately within the opening phrases of the movement, its use in the structure on a larger scale follows naturally. This grandiose ambiguity of stability and tension – a characteristic sound, massive and yet disquieting – is the key to this work's tranquil power.

Mozart's greatest concertos are the fanfare of a world history about to begin. One of the crucial historical preconditions of this fanfare was the rise of the semi-autonomous networks of musical production, performance and reception which sustained the musicians of the First Viennese School, that is to say, the emergence of post-feudal or national audiences.

The power of these audiences helps to explain one of the most intriguing aspects of the first half of the second supercycle, namely the sudden emancipation of the intellectual disciplines from the clutches of their nobilitarian and ecclesiastical predecessors. In the decade of the 1770s, the discursive field of economics emerges from the mercantilist treatise, the field of history emerges from the nobilitarian lineage, and the field of psychology emerges from the liturgical confession.

Adam Smith's *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) is a case in point. This was not only the first sociological analysis of labor productivity under British national capitalism, it was also the first coherent theory of the geopolitical unconscious, in the form of Smith's thesis of the “invisible hand” of the marketplace. Despite the limitations of Smith's work – nowhere does he account for the critical role of the British imperial state, the wageless labor systems of the Atlantic and Eurasia, or unequal imperial trade – his work fulfilled a genuine social need for systemic explanations of 18th century capitalism.
Similarly, Edward Gibbon's six-volume *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-1788) delivered one of the first systemic explorations of British national history, wherein the class conflicts of the Roman nobility, slaves and plebians provide a palimpsest to depict the class struggles of the British empire.

Much of the credit for the invention of the modern psychological study can be attributed to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Confessions*, the first autobiography of the Swiss national citizen. Completed in 1770 and published in 1778, four years after his death, Rousseau's achievement would not be matched in Britain until Equiano's 1789 autobiography and Boswell's *Life of Johnson* (1791). It speaks volumes about the underdevelopment of the German-speaking regions vis-a-vis Britain, France and Switzerland that the closest equivalent of Rousseau's text in the German-speaking region, Goethe's *Poetry and Truth*, would not appear until 1833.

It is at this point that we need to address the question of why the emergence of the US empire in the 1770s and 1780s ultimately aided rather than hindered Britain's rise to hegemony. Our provisional thesis is that the experience of imperial defeat was a productive force in fostering Britain's hegemony, in much the same way that harmonic dissonance was a productive force enabling Mozart's invention of chromatic dissonance, or that the Baltic marketplace was a productive force enabling the Kantian thesis of an a priori national juridicality.

We noted previously that the oceanic radicalisms played a key role in helping the United States to defeat the British empire, and in transforming the struggles of abolitionism and suffrage into mass movements. The necessity of confronting this radicalism triggered one of the most extraordinary political transformations of the late 18th century, namely the parliamentary triumph of William Pitt the Younger in 1783. Pitt's triumph was far more than a change of personnel. It marked the transformation of British parliamentary politics away from its previous role as a means of managing inter-elite tensions and disagreements, and towards a new role of managing the conflicts of managing a vast global empire.

The youngest prime minister in British parliamentary history, Pitt also served as the Chancellor of the Exchequer during his tenure. He inaugurated a far-reaching set of administrative and economic reforms between 1784 and 1801 which would catapult Britain into the role of world hegemon. These reforms combined a significant expansion of taxation, the expansion of cost controls and bureaucratic oversight over government spending, and massive deficit spending. To appreciate the magnitude of the challenge facing Pitt, Britain's national debt rose from 83% of GDP in 1720 to 158% in 1763, the end of the Seven Years War. The debt declined to 106% of GDP by 1775, before climbing once more to 154% by 1784, the end of the American revolutionary war.

Britain's position looks even more tenuous when compared to its leading competitors. David Weir has constructed the following estimates of the fiscal position of the British, French, Dutch and US governments in the late 1780s and early 1790s:42
**Table 2. Fiscal positions of Britain, France, Netherlands and United States, Late 18th Century.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Britain 1788</th>
<th>France 1788</th>
<th>Netherlands 1800</th>
<th>US 1792-1794</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>134.8 million £</td>
<td>6,977 million livres tournois (at 1 £ = 25 livres, 279.1 million £, or 10.5 £ per capita)</td>
<td>GNI of 495 million guilders in 1807, at 12 guilders to 1 pound exchange rate = 41.25 million £ (19.5 £ per capita)</td>
<td>$254 million (at 4.75 per £, 53.47 million £, or 12.4 £ per capita)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government revenues as % GDP</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National debt as % GDP</td>
<td>181.8%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After Pitt's reforms, the debt decreased to 119% in 1794, before skyrocketing during the Napoleonic wars to an unprecedented 226% of GDP by 1815. The debt peaked at 260% of GDP in 1821, before beginning a century of decline until the third supercycle of 1914-1945:
Figure 1. British national government debt as a percent of British GDP between 1692-2010.43

This mountain of debt not only financed Britain's military-industrial complex, it fuelled the entire British economy and ensured the defeat of the Napoleonic empire. Far from being the product of small-scale entrepreneurial initiative, British national capitalism was constructed on the most efficient and well-organized state machinery of its time. N.A.M. Rodger describes how decades of large-scale state intervention spurred a productivity revolution in British rural capitalism:

Beyond naval operations, the work of the Victualling Board has a wider significance for the agricultural and economic history of Britain. The Board was the largest single purchaser on the London markets for agricultural products, and its policy of managing the markets so as to encourage the growth of large firms, while at the same time promoting competition, was at least influential, and possibly critical, in the growth of a sophisticated and integrated national and eventually international agricultural market. The British economy was unique in that there were few peasants, in the sense of subsistence farmers. Even small producers in remote parts were accustomed to serving a national market, exporting their goods (usually by coastal shipping) to London, being paid by bills which they could discount locally, investing their savings in the financial markets.44

While Britain's military-industrial complex generated comparatively few technological innovations, the enormous boost it gave to final consumer demand transformed a highly
commercialized but preindustrial economy into the world's biggest producer of manufactures. The expenditures of the Napoleonic wars were indispensable to Britain's industrial takeoff:

Naval establishments represented in many respects so many islands of the nineteenth century in the eighteenth century countryside. These enormous and complex enterprises faced challenges of management and control which were as yet unknown to private businesses, or to any other part of government. It seems that they transferred relatively few skills to the national economy, which still had little need of them, but their very large-scale purchases of goods and services of high quality at keen prices provided a powerful engine driving the growth of the national agricultural market, and certain international trades such as timber imports. Around them the British economy was still agricultural and commercial rather than industrial, but increasingly sophisticated and integrated. The geography of the British Isles gave most districts access to coastal shipping, and only the efficiencies of water transport (which contemporaries reckoned to cost at most about one-twentieth of road transport) made possible a national market, integrated directly into international markets. Even small ports gave direct access to overseas markets, and exposed local business to the requirements of international trade. In the early eighteenth century the little Dorset port of Lyme Regis, for example, was importing sugar from the West Indies and tobacco from Virginia and in return exporting drapery, canvas, gloves, saddlery, hats, gowns, kerseys, soap, earthenware, nails, ironware, shoes and beer bottles, among other things, the products of craftsmen and small businesses in the surrounding towns and villages of Dorset, Devon and Wilshire.45

In addition to generating final consumer demand, the British military-industrial complex also played a crucial role in the construction and operation of a hegemonic merchant and naval fleet. While the Dutch fleet was hegemonic at the beginning of the Dutch-French era, Louis XIV's France caught up quickly thanks to heavy investments in the royal navy. As late as 1710, the combined Dutch and French navies were significantly larger than those of Britain. By the 1730s, however, the vast profits of Britain's maritime colonies enabled it to become the world's single largest naval power. By the 1750s, the British navy had achieved absolute numerical dominance over its Dutch and French competitors. By the Napoleonic era, British naval dominance was assured. “For the first and last time in history,” notes Rodger, “a single navy possessed half of all the world's warships.”46 The following two charts illustrate the average number of ships of the line (the largest battleships) deployed by the six most powerful navies of the world between 1650 and 1815:
The number of cruisers deployed by each national fleet follows a similar pattern. The Dutch and French fleets kept pace with their British competitors until 1700, and were a collective match for the latter as late as the 1740s. By the 1750s, Britain pulled ahead for good:

**Figure 2.** Naval strength in ships of the line, 1650-1815.\(^{47}\)

**Figure 3.** Naval strength in cruisers, 1650-1815.\(^{48}\)
It should be noted that these charts understate the true degree of British naval superiority, thanks to Britain's experience operating the world's largest commercial fleet. This translated into superior British logistics, ship-building, maintenance and rigging techniques vis-a-vis their European competitors, especially in the second half of the 18th century. British ships were slightly smaller than comparable French ships, but were more flexible in adverse weather conditions, more maneuverable, and far more durable:

British ships continued to be somewhat smaller in tonnage and shorter, but more heavily timbered and fastened. Their rig and lines performed best in going to windward, and in heavy weather. They were built to stand the strain of prolonged sea-time at all seasons, they were stored for long cruises, and they were built to fight. They were also built to last; relatively cheap to construct and maintain, they were the rational choice of a navy which meant to surpass its enemies both in numbers and in stamina. Their rig masts, sails, cordage, blocks, pumps, cables, steering gear and fittings of every kind were greatly superior in design and quality. French ships of all classes were slightly built of inferior timber, fastened with nails instead of trenails, but their very long hulls were highly stressed in a seaway. In fine weather these 'battle-cruisers' with their long hulls and taut rigs were fast off the wind, but their performance fell off rapidly when close hauled, or when wind and sea rose. What was worse French designers seem to have had something of an obsession with reducing the depth and weight of the hull, which made their ships light and buoyant, but directly weakened resistance to hogging, sagging and racking strains. Worst of all they actually believed that the working of the timbers increased the speed of the ship. Consequently these ships had high building costs, high maintenance costs and short working lives, which made France's low investment in docks and yards all the more expensive. In close action French ships with their light scantlings were a death trap.49

With this insight into the nexus of British commercial and naval power, we can finally begin to unravel the two-century-old mystery of the antinomian character of the French revolution. Between 1789 and 1797, France witnessed a series of national political mobilizations far more radical than those of the American revolution. Yet between 1798 and 1812, France was the site of the most revanchist and retrograde imperialism of the second supercycle.

This remarkable turnabout is not to be explained away as a simple reaction to the previous period's revolutionary excesses. It is the expression of a deep geopolitical contradiction. This contradiction is rooted in the fact that the July 1789 French insurrection was only one of three insurrections to break out in the most commercialized regions of western Europe during the second supercycle. The other two insurrections were the Dutch Patriot uprising of 1780-1787, and the Brabant or Belgian uprising of October 1789.

Whereas the three American insurrections had the geographical advantages of a vast intervening ocean, an endless internal frontier, and settlements spread over the coastline of a continent, all three European insurrections were located next to neighboring dynastic polities. This made them far more vulnerable to internal factionalism and external military pressure.

While the Patriots' mildly reformist program was almost indistinguishable from that of Pitt the Younger, scandalized Orangist conservatives called in the Prussian army to crush the Patriot rebellion in 1787.50 A similar combination of internal strife and external military pressure derailed the Brabant revolt, which split into two irreconcilable factions. The conservative and
clerical-minded Statists eventually defeated the liberal-minded Vonckists, only to be ousted by an Austrian army in 1790.

The French insurrection survived primarily because France was the dominant demographic and military power of Europe, and could not be easily subdued by its immediate neighbors. Conversely, the demographic and economic primacy of France was both an opportunity for and a danger to the elites of the Third Estate who instigated the July 1789 insurrection. Unlike the United States, where the northern merchants, central land-speculators and southern planters quickly united around a single project of continental land expansionism, the only two options of a possible French national imperial expansionism were either the conquest of its smaller European neighbors, or a renewed maritime expansion at the expense of the British, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish empires.

Both strategies required a profound transformation of the French state, namely the creation of a system of public debt similar to the ones which financed the expansion of the Dutch and British empires. At the very beginning of this transformation, however, something happened which ensured that the French revolution would never become the mere repetition of the American revolution. This was the unexpected arrival of a new force of world history, namely the moment that the oceanic radicalisms of wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers turned into a coherent class project.

This class project generated two of the most radical political innovations of the second supercycle, namely the national people's army and the national political club. The people's army transformed the citizen-soldiers of the English civil war and the popular militias of the American revolution into the world's first abolitionist army. Created by the wageless and partly waged laborers of Haiti on August 21, 1791, this army abolished slavery on approximately one-third of the island and forced the French authorities to negotiate with Haitians as political subjects. The people's army would spread to France two years later, in the form of the national mass levy of 1793.

The national political club was invented by the French Jacobins, who transformed the informal political associations of the English Levellers, the American Sons of Liberty, the French Society of Thirty, and various British anti-slavery organizations into history's first national mass political party. Founded in 1789 by deputies from Brittany, the members of the Jacobin club became the driving force of the so-called Montagnards (literally, “mountaineers”), the radical parliamentary faction of the Legislative Assembly, the legislative body which ruled France between October 1, 1791 and September 20, 1792.

During this period, the Montagnards controlled 18% of the body's 745 seats, about half the size of the 35% of the seats controlled by the conservatives. The intense contradictions between these factions, combined with increasing antagonism towards the French monarchy and the threat of external intervention, caused the Assembly to declare war on Austria on April 20, 1792. That summer, the Jacobins and their network of clubs successfully mobilized the Parisian crowds during the uprising of August 10, 1792. This uprising deposed the French monarchy, and ushered in the rule of the National Convention on September 20, 1792. Based on a careful review of the documentary evidence, Benjamin Reilly argues that 51% of the members of the new National Convention could be classified as Montagnards, 38% as centrists (the so-called Girondins, though the line between them and the Montagnards was often blurry) and only 11% as conservatives – a remarkable political shift in just six months.
These twin uprisings were more than just a shocking and unexpected challenge to the rule of French elites, as well as to the rule of the other super-empires. They were the first attempt in world history to create planetary solidarity among American slaves and citizens, French sans-culottes and city-dwellers, and Austrian, Prussian and Russian serfs. As such, they suffered from all the characteristic defects of first attempts, ranging from ideological incoherence to organizational dysfunction.

The Haitian people’s army was always split between small numbers of French-speaking wageless and partly waged laborers with some history of property accumulation and education, most notably free citizens of color, and large numbers of wageless laborers who were recent arrivals on the island and characterized by enormous linguistic and social heterogeneity. The leadership of Toussaint Louverture – himself a French-speaking freed slave turned elite planter – temporarily stabilized this rift, but could not overcome it.

Conversely, the Jacobin clubs suffered from the contradiction of being a national political party without a functional nation-state to administer. The Legislative Assembly voted to abolish slavery as early as April 4, 1792, but the policy was never enforced. The subsequent National Convention proclaimed universal suffrage to all male French citizens twenty-five years and older, but only ten percent of the eligible electorate participated in subsequent votes. The French constitution of 1793, approved by a popular referendum, prohibited chattel slavery (Article 18) while guaranteeing public welfare (Article 21) and education for all (Article 22), but was never implemented.54

For all of their organizational weaknesses and structural limitations, these two uprisings had an incalculable impact on the trajectory of the second supercycle. One of the most important and least-appreciated effects of the Haitian revolution was to trigger a serious economic crisis for the merchant elites of the French Atlantic coast, especially those of Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Le Havre and Nantes. This foreclosed the possibility of these cities catalyzing French industrialization in the manner that the British port cities of Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow intermediated the vast streams of Atlantic wageless labor embodied in the coffee, cotton, indigo, jute, tea and sugar trades on behalf of early British industrialization. This economic shock weakened the commercial underpinnings of French maritime expansionism, and helped doom Napoleonic France to permanent naval inferiority vis-a-vis Britain.

It also exacerbated the internal class struggle between French crowds and French elites. These latter could not appease the former by means of continental land expansionism, the favored strategy of US elites. Nor could they finance domestic economic growth by leveraging an ever-increasing flow of colonial rents to finance a vast expansion of public debt, the British strategy. What made an already parlous situation completely untenable was the fact that the French state had to finance a two-front war against domestic uprisings as well as foreign invaders.

The result was that French elites papered over the economic crisis by issuing vast quantities of increasingly unreal fiat money, and papered over the political crisis by recourse to increasingly repressive administrative fiat. This fiat money took the form of assignats, financial instruments originally designed to be long-term national debt but converted into a rapidly-depreciating paper currency. These assignats lost two-fifths of their original value as early as 1793, seventy percent by 1795, and became virtually worthless after 1796:
The political legitimacy of the French republic experienced a similar erosion of public credibility, as the authorities criminalized dissent, abrogated the civil rights proclaimed in 1789, and requisitioned soldiers and resources from the rural economy. This set off a downwards spiral of increasing internal discontent, intensified republican repression, and accelerating external intervention, culminating in open internal rebellions and external wars.

One of the clearest forms of this legitimation crisis was the Chouannerie, a series of armed uprisings of a section of the French peasantry between 1793 and 1800. The most famous of these uprisings, the Vendée, erupted on March 11, 1793 in western France as a protest against the imposition of mass levies for the national army and the republican assault on the Catholic church. In response, the Committee of Public Safety was created in April 1793 to crush the insurgency. The ensuing civil war would inflict widespread carnage and economic disruption on the countryside, and cost the lives of approximately 170,000 to 200,000 soldiers and civilians between 1793 and 1801.55

The rampant paranoia and intercine violence of the civil war, combined with the outbreak of the War of the First Coalition (1793-1797), an anti-French alliance of the Austrian, British, Prussian and Russian empires, triggered renewed factional turmoil within the National Convention. The result was the purging of a number of centrist Girondins between May 31 and June 2, 1793, followed by the elevation of the Committee to near-total authority over the executive branch of the government in July 1793.

This extreme centralization of power ushered in the year-long period of mass repression known as the Reign of Terror. The political content of the Terror was delivered by the National Convention on August 23, 1793, in the decree authorizing the “levée en masse”, the second national mass mobilization in history after the mobilization of Haiti’s wageless laborers in 1791:
From this time until the moment its enemies have been driven from the territory of the Republic, everyone French [tous les Français] is in permanent requisition for the armed services. Young men shall go off to battle; married men shall forge weapons and transport provisions; women shall make tents and serve in hospitals; children shall turn old rags into linen; the elderly shall go to the public squares in order to incite the courage of the warriors, preaching the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.  

The authorities increased the size of the army to around 800,000 soldiers by September, stabilizing the front lines and preventing the foreign invasion of France. This logistical achievement came at the price of fearsome internal repression. On September 17, 1793, the Committee decreed the Law of Suspects, mandating the arrest of anyone the authorities deemed a threat to the revolution. An estimated 70,000 to 300,000 suspects were arbitrarily arrested over the following twelve months, while approximately 17,000 were executed.

This expansion of the coercive power of the state was accompanied by increased state intervention into the economy. On September 29, 1793, the Law of Suspects was expanded to include the General Maximum, a set of price controls on staple goods such as firewood, flour, grain, leather, meat, oil, onions, paper and soap. The law was not widely enforced during the year it remained in existence, and did nothing to halt the depreciation of the assignat. However, it is significant that subsequent French governments felt compelled to purchase and distribute discounted bread and meat to the poorest residents of Paris as a means of ensuring social peace.

While the front lines quickly stabilized, the continuation of the economic and political crisis eventually led to Thermidor, the July 1794 coup which overthrew the rule of Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety. The Committee was replaced by the Directory, a transitional governance structure comprised of a five-person executive branch and a bicameral national parliament. The Girondins purged in 1793 were allowed to return to the Convention, and fresh elections in 1795 replaced the previous Montagnard majority with a solid Thermidorian majority.

While the new regime halted the more egregious excesses of the Terror, freeing numerous detainees and restoring some civil liberties, the republican regime continued to suffer from an intractable economic crisis, endemic violence between political factions, and the financial burdens of external warfare. This combination of internal and external pressure gradually but inexorably transformed the national people's army created for defensive purposes in 1793 into an offensive army of national imperialism. The first sign of this national imperialism was the slow but inexorable transformation of the army into the fulcrum of republican authority. On May 20, 1795, a Jacobin-led urban crowd rose up against the Directory in Paris, only to be defeated over the next two days by the army. A few months later, an armed uprising of royalists was crushed in the streets of Paris on October 5, 1795 by a promising young officer named Napoleon Bonaparte.

In addition to its increasing political sway, the republican army acquired prestige by successfully mobilizing France's vast demographic resources to defeat the much smaller armies of neighboring European powers. French armies won a series of landmark victories in 1795, enabling French troops to annex Belgium and to install the Batavian Republic in the United Provinces, the prototype of the proxy regimes of the Napoleonic period. In October of 1795, the Directory picked up the baton Louis XIV had dropped in 1715, by proclaiming that France's...
borders would now extend to the Pyrenees in the south, and to the Rhine and to the Alps in the east.

It is an irony of history that the final death-knell of the French revolution was not the crushing of Babeuf's conspiracy on May 10, 1796, but the repression of legitimately elected royalists to the National Convention in 1797. In March and April 1797, the royalists won about a third of all the contested seats in the parliament. On September 4, 1797, a coup annulled the elections of over two hundred royalist deputies, and Napoleon was installed as the primary military leader of the Directory. Howard Brown provides this astute description of the transitional period between this moment and Napoleon's total conquest of power in 1801:

Efforts to establish a liberal democracy failed, and the French revolution came to an end only after prolonged violence, perpetrated both by and against republicans, provoked widespread support for novel forms of controlled repression. The escalating judicial and military repression that resulted was far greater than previously known and provides the central continuity between the Director and the Consulate. Furthermore, the crackdown that occurred from 1797 to 1801 was a pivotal moment in the history of repression in France, not as bloody as the Terror but more fruitful in generating the pattern of 'liberal authoritarianism' that confronted every uprising of the nineteenth century. The Faustian pact that ordinary citizens made with the so-called forces of order enabled the creation of a modern 'security state' based on administrative surveillance, coercive policing, and the legitimacy that came with restoring and maintaining order. The emergence of this security state ended the French Revolution. Only the apparatus of the security state made it possible to allow emigres to return, priests to take up their ministries, and citizens to respect the authority of the republic. It also provided Napoleon Bonaparte with the basis for his personal dictatorship, which may have been predictable but was certainly not inevitable.59

The trial run of Napoleonic rule began in 1798 with the imposition of “Sister Republics” on twenty-nine regions of Europe, proxy regimes modeled on the Batavian republic through which France had controlled the United Provinces since 1795. The most significant of these republics included the Cisalpine Republic in Milan, the Helvetic Republic in Switzerland, the Ligurian Republic in Genoa, the Piedmontese Republic in Piedmont, and the Roman Republic in Rome.60 All collapsed due to internal uprisings, or were subsumed by full-scale French national annexation.

These sister republics were more than just a transitional phase between revolutionary republicanism and Napoleonic despotism. They were the crucial test bed for the main economic, political and cultural strategies of Napoleon's rule, or what we will call Napoleonomics, the reign of the industrial dynast, and the enforcement of the Code Napoleon, respectively. All three were pragmatic responses to the problem of reconciling the progressive rhetoric of republican liberty with the revanchist reality of colonial despotism.

The prehistory of Napoleonomics can be traced back to the emergency fiscal measures of the earliest years of the French revolution, when the authorities expropriated the properties of the monarchy and the church. However, the outbreak of continental war in mid-1792 and the inability of the republican regime to collect taxes from a restive population quickly exhausted this resource. Eugene White describes the scale of the resulting fiscal crisis:
The budgetary stalemate required the printing of more assignats, fueling inflation. In 1792, total expenditures were 1,363 million livres, with taxes covering 371 million livres and money creation the remainder. In the first nine months of 1793, taxes offered only 259 million livres towards expenses of 2,667 million livres. For the revolutionary Year II – the following twelve months – total revenues increased to supply 43 percent of 4.8 billion livres of expenditures, leaving the rest to be funded by the creation of assignats.61

The result was roaring inflation, bread riots, and three years of chronic economic instability. Beginning in 1798, the republican authorities finally to restabilized the financial sector by applying the three cardinal principles of Napoleconomics – the cessation of national debt issuance, the reimposition of effective tax collection on the French economy through indirect taxes, and the extraction of fiscal resources from conquered European territories. For example, French armies looted thirty million francs (£1.2 million) from the Vatican treasury during the occupation of Rome on February 15, 1798, and another sixteen million francs (£0.64 million) from the treasury of Bern on August 26, 1798.

It is important to stress that plunder did not pay for the entire cost of maintaining the French state. “At most,” observes White, “the total extracted and sent home between 1792 and 1799 was 360 million livres, which was only somewhat half of the budget for any peacetime pre-Revolution year.”62 The resulting 45 million livres per annum extracted by plunder was not enough to offset the decline in domestic French tax revenues from 472 million livres in 1788 to 279 million livres in 1795-1796. Under Napoleon's rule, the scale of plunder increased, but the increase in domestic tax collection was far more significant.

French tax revenues rose to 495 million francs (£19.8 million) in 1800-1801 and increased steadily thereafter, peaking at 1.264 billion francs (£50.6 million) in 1813.63 Pierre Branda estimates that the total of all forms of Napoleonic plunder, from financial extractions to the subsidized quartering of French troops, amounted to 1.8 billion francs (£72 million) between 1802 and 1814. This was only 26% of total French military expenditures of 6.74 billion francs (£269.6 million) over this period.64

One of the reasons for the British empire's eventual victory over its French challenger was its capacity to outspend the latter. British military expenditures skyrocketed from £7.3 million in 1793 to £32 million by 1800, and peaked at £74.4 million in 1814. Between 1802 and 1814, Britain expended £579.8 million on its military, twice as much as the comparable French figure.65 This vast expenditure of funds paid for the soldiers, muskets, cannons, ships and supplies which defeated Napoleon, and helped jumpstart the Industrial Revolution.

This raises the question as to why the Napoleonic dictatorship, despite France's considerable economic wealth and a population three times the size of Britain, could never match British military spending. To understand why this was so, we must pause for a moment to consider the single most striking political innovation of Napoleon's rule. This is the charismatic rule of the industrial dynast, a figure halfway between the dynastic rulers and nobilitarian lineages of the 1648-1775 Dutch-French co-hegemony and the constitutional monarchies and business oligarchies of the 1815-1914 British hegemony.

Just as the oceanic radicalisms of the 1780s and 1790s anticipated centuries of future political innovations, so too did the Napoleonic revanchisms of the 1790s and 1810s anticipate
centuries of political reaction to come. Whereas the dynastic regimes of the past employed plunder to ensure the loyalty of nobilitarian lineages, the industrial dynast employed plunder to ensure the loyalty of national patrimonial networks. The single most powerful of these patrimonial networks in post-1798 France was that of the national army, and the single most important source of funds for this army was wartime plunder.

What made Napoleonomics utterly irresistible over the short term – and wholly self-destructive over the long term – was Napoleon's unrivaled capacity to stage spectacular imperial gambles, and then to administer the resulting plunder to the legions of ambitious young French officers following in his footsteps. Put bluntly, Napoleonomics was never designed to make war pay for war. It was a gigantic political speculation designed to legitimate war with war. The problem with this strategy is that the more it succeeded, the more it had to fail. The demonic void at the heart of Napoleon's rule, to paraphrase Paul W. Schroeder's insightful essay, was expansionism for expansionism's sake, that is to say, conquest on behalf of a national imperialism not yet backed by a coherent national capitalism.

Put more dialectically still, the two core strengths of the industrial dynast – political and military centralization – were also its irreparable weaknesses. Napoleon's overwhelming domestic legitimacy, expressed in plebiscites as well as the willingness of French citizens to serve in the national army, was impossible to duplicate outside of France. The result was a permanent legitimation crisis in the occupied territories of Europe, unwillingness to serve in French mercenary armies, and eventually open rebellion against French rule.

Similarly, the two core strengths of Napoleonomics – the military plunder it extracted from other European polities, and its increased state taxation of the French economy – could not increase final consumer demand or boost the underlying productivity of the French economy. As a result, Britain's maritime-fuelled economic growth far outpaced that of France during the Napoleonic era, an outcome exacerbated by Britain's naval blockade and Napoleon's subsequent Continental System. When the Napoleonic empire ran out of fresh European polities to plunder – the tipping point was reached after Napoleon's victory at Tilsit in 1807, halfway through his reign – it would be unable to match British military spending.

It is striking how the two trial runs of Napoleonic expansionism – Napoleon's 1798 invasion of Ottoman-controlled Egypt, just prior to his conquest of power, and the 1802 invasion of Saint Domingue (Haiti) – are microcosms of the long-term trajectory of the Napoleonic imperial gamble. Both invasions were aimed at destabilizing the Caribbean and South Asian anchors of the British empire. The aim of the Egyptian invasion was to establish a Middle Eastern colony and eventually to annex Britain's South Asian colonies, while the goal of the Haitian invasion was to reconquer the most valuable sugar colony of the French Caribbean and refound a French colonial empire in the Americas. Both invasions began with dazzling initial success, bogged down into a costly and protracted occupation, and finally devolved into an outright military and economic disaster. When both gambles failed, Napoleon seized this failure as an excuse to launch even bigger gambles. Where the Bourbon dynasties remembered nothing and learned nothing from history, Napoleon remembered nothing and learned nothing from his previous gambles.

Perhaps the single best summary of the short-term might and long-term debility of the Napoleonic gamble is his speech on May 19, 1798, announcing the invasion of Egypt. Napoleon cashiered the Jacobin ideal of equality with universal fealty to the emperor, the Committee's
despotism with the imperial despot, and the artificial cult of Reason with the equally artificial Code Napoleon:

Soldiers, the eyes of Europe are upon you! You have a grand destiny to fulfill, battles to win, dangers and hardships to overcome; you will achieve more than you ever have before for the prosperity of the homeland, the happiness of humanity and your own glory.

Soldiers, sailors, infantry, gunners, riders, be as one. Remember that on the day of battle you will need each other.

Soldiers, sailors, previously you were neglected; today the Republic has the greatest solicitude for you; you will be worthy of the army of which you are a part.

The genius of liberty, which has rendered the Republic the arbiter of Europe since its birth, wishes to be that [i.e. the arbiter] of the most distant oceans and nations.70

At the time, Napoleon was still nominally under the command of the Directory, but wielded enough power to organize and carry out the expedition. This drew the Ottoman empire into the conflicts of the second supercycle, and triggered the War of the Second Coalition (1798-1802). The early phase of this war was characterized by a series of British naval victories in the Mediterranean, and a series of land victories by the French expeditionary army against Ottoman forces. However, France's logistical inability to feed and resupply its soldiers by sea caused its army to wither and eventually disintegrate. Ever the consummate gambler, Napoleon secretly returned to France before reports of the disaster could reach the Directory, and seized sole power in the 1799 coup of the 18th Brumaire.

What made Napoleon's gambles so successful between 1798 and 1807, and so disastrous between 1808 and 1815, was not arbitrary caprice or imperial hubris. In fact, Napoleon's successes as well as his failures were based on the underlying collateral of French demographics, namely the pool of 2.95 million French soldiers who served in Napoleon's armies between 1799 and 1815.

It is striking that Napoleon's two most famous military innovations – the mobile infantry column and massed mobile artillery, respectively – were speculations on French lives. Both techniques maximized the battlefield effectiveness of large numbers of French citizen-soldier vis-a-vis the less motivated and numerically smaller armies of other European powers. They were the weaponization of French esprit de corps.71 While irresistible in the short run, this weaponization began to falter the moment the Napoleonic empire had to administer occupied territories, e.g. the approximately one million non-French conscripts who served in Napoleon's armies were prone to demoralization and defection.72

What defeated the weaponization of French lives was the industrialization of British workers. The Napoleonic empire expended its wartime plunder on launching ever bigger wars, and was thus doomed to exhaust its underlying human collateral. By contrast, the British empire reinvested its colonial surplus back into its navy and its factories, thereby jumpstarting the Industrial Revolution.73 This navy enabled the British empire to seize the maritime holdings of its competitors (e.g. Sri Lanka and South Africa were permanently taken from the Dutch in 1796 and 1806, respectively), to send a trade delegation to Qing China in 1793 (Macartney's mission was ultimately unsuccessful, but marked a watershed in the capacity of the British empire to
transform maritime prowess into economic power), to plunder South Asia to finance its anti-Napoleonic wars, and to establish a brand-new colony on the coast of Australia in 1788.

Accelerated British economic growth plus deficit spending enabled the British state to pay for and equip anti-Napoleonic coalitions large enough to neutralize France's demographic advantage. Between 1792 and 1815, approximately 2.1 million Russians, 1 million Austrians, 1 million Britons, and 1 million Prussians served in these coalitions, while an additional million Portuguese and Spanish soldiers and guerillas fought against Napoleon's armies between 1808 and 1814. With typical perspicacity, Marx summarized the major contradictions of the Napoleon's rule as follows:

Napoleon represented the last battle of revolutionary terror against the bourgeois society which had been proclaimed by this same Revolution, and against its policy. Napoleon, of course, already discerned the essence of the modern state; he understood that it is based on the unhampered development of bourgeois society, on the free movement of private interest, etc. He decided to recognise and protect this basis. He was no terrorist with his head in the clouds. Yet at the same time he still regarded the state as an end in itself and civil life only as a treasurer and his subordinate which must have no will of its own. He perfected the Terror by substituting permanent war for permanent revolution. He fed the egoism of the French nation to complete satiety but demanded also the sacrifice of bourgeois business, enjoyments, wealth, etc., whenever this was required by the political aim of conquest. If he despotically suppressed the liberalism of bourgeois society – the political idealism of its daily practice – he showed no more consideration for its essential material interests, trade and industry, whenever they conflicted with his political interests. His scorn of industrial hommes d'affaires was the complement to his scorn of ideologists. In his home policy, too, he combated bourgeois society as the opponent of the state which in his own person he still held to be an absolute aim in itself. Thus he declared in the State Council that he would not suffer the owner of extensive estates to cultivate them or not as he pleased. Thus, too, he conceived the plan of subordinating trade to the state by appropriation of roulage [road haulage]. French businessmen took steps to anticipate the event that first shook Napoleon's power. Paris exchange-brokers forced him by means of an artificially created famine to delay the opening of the Russian campaign by nearly two months and thus to launch it too late in the year.

To Napoleon, civil life (what we would call today “civil society”) was merely a treasurer, i.e. the funder of military gambles. This helps to explain why the least developed aspect of Napoleon's rule was the Code Napoleon, the nominal attempt to transform France's archaic juridical infrastructures into a single national juridical system. This attempt ran aground on the incapacity of the juridical system to exercise genuine constraints on Napoleon's executive authority. While the Code did contribute to the modernization of the French state, it did not fundamentally transform the conquered European territories it was transplanted to. From beginning to end, the various French and Napoleonic occupations brought financial extractionism rather than modernization to the rest of Europe.

Given the inherent structural weaknesses of the Napoleonic empire and the deep unpopularity of its occupation policies, it is worth asking why it took the British empire and its European allies fifteen years to subdue Napoleon, or put more bluntly, why the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Coalitions of 1799-1809 failed again and again – until the final and decisive Sixth Coalition succeeded.
One of the most intriguing paradoxes of the second supercycle is that it was the French empire's string of victories between 1795 and 1807 which locked it into ultimate failure, precisely where the British empire's string of defeats between 1783 and 1807 locked it into ultimate success. Put another way, the second supercycle lasted for as long as it did because the British empire had to fail spectacularly and repeatedly, in order to eventually succeed. The successive defeats of the official British interventions against the American revolution (1775-1783), against the French revolution (1792-1797), and against the Haitian revolution (1794-1798), the unofficial intervention against Spanish-held Argentina in 1806, and the four official coalitions against Napoleon between 1799 and 1809 were the necessary precondition of Britain's post-1812 triumph. British elites learned because they had to, while French elites never had to learn – until it was too late.

We have already mentioned the political impact of the American revolution on Britain, namely the fact that Pitt the Younger dramatically increased the effectiveness of state fiscal spending and overall governance. In addition, the economic dynamism of the newly independent United States generated enormous wealth for British merchants and entrepreneurs. That said, Britain's intervention in the Haitian revolution and British expansionism in South Asia were equally formative experiences. The Haitian intervention taught British elites what imperial strategies would fail, while the South Asian intervention taught them what imperial strategies would succeed.

To understand why this is so, it is important to stress that the Haitian revolution was part of a titanic wave of uprisings which swept the Caribbean during the second supercycle. One of the factors which made these uprisings possible was the fact that the enslaved population of the Caribbean was twice as large as the corresponding population of whites, free blacks and free members of mixed races (by contrast, wageless laborers were only 18% of the total US population of 3.9 million in 1790, and only 31% of the estimated Brazilian population of 3.6 million in 1819).

Between 1791 and 1816, slave insurrections erupted in eight of the seventeen most populous islands of the Caribbean. These eight islands had a population of 1.26 million in 1789, comprising four-fifths of the entire Caribbean population of 1.56 million. Armed with the new modes of mass mobilization spawned by the oceanic radicalisms, the wageless laborers of the Blood Islands rose up in a series of Island Insurrections. Here is a comprehensive list of these uprisings, along with estimated numbers of wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers residing on each island:

Table 3. Largest slave insurrections in the Caribbean during the second supercycle.²⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caribbean Island</th>
<th>Colonial Power</th>
<th>Wageless laborers</th>
<th>Partly and fully waged laborers</th>
<th>Major uprisings of forms of resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saint Domingue (Haiti)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>465,000 (1789)</td>
<td>58,000 (30,000 white, 28,000 mixed)</td>
<td>Haitian Revolution 1791-1804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>205,261</td>
<td>18,420</td>
<td>Second Maroon War 1795-1796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadaloupe</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>90,134 (1790)</td>
<td>17,094 (13,969 white, 3,125 mixed)</td>
<td>Louis Delgrès's rebellion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38
<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>85,900 (1792)</td>
<td>274,000 (1774)</td>
<td>Rebellion in 1809, Aponte's rebellion 1812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinique</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>83,000 (1789)</td>
<td>15,600 (10,600 white, 5,000 mixed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>68,548</td>
<td>18,532</td>
<td>Bussa's rebellion 1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>37,808</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>26,211</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>Fedon's rebellion 1795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>23,462</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>18,753</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>11,853</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>Slave uprising 1795-1796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevis</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>9,834</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobago</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>8,643</td>
<td>391</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curaçao</td>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>4,000 (1795)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Tula uprising 1795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6,537 (1776)</td>
<td>73,709 (1776)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Less than 1,000</td>
<td>Constant flight to frontier, partial disruption of slave trade by British occupation, small-scale rebellions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Memo note:</strong></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>694,280</td>
<td>3,234,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,107,389</td>
<td>2,488,743</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is no accident that the other regions of the world-system characterized by endemic wageless labor, namely Eastern Europe and Eurasia, experienced significant uprisings at approximately the same time as the Caribbean insurrections. Massive rebellions of enserfed laborers occurred in Austria-controlled Czechia and Transylvania (Hungary) in 1780, in Transylvania once more in 1790, and in Polish Silesia in 1784, 1793, 1798 and 1811. Partly in response to this wave of unrest, and partly in response to Napoleon's defeat of the Fourth Coalition (1806-1807), reformers in Prussia abolished serfdom on its territory in 1807, decades ahead of abolition in Austria (1848) and Russia (1861).
In fact, these parallels are so significant that we will suggest the Haitian revolution offers an indispensable metric to understand the anticolonial struggles of the late 19th century Cuba and the Philippines against Spain and the United States, as well as the early 20th century anticolonial struggles of Poland and Ukraine against the 19th century Austrian, German, Russian and post-1918 Soviet empires. Just as the struggles for Polish and Ukrainian independence both parallel and diverge from the anti-imperial mass struggles and uprisings of the 1917 Russian revolution and the 1918 Austrian and German revolutions, so too did the events of the Haitian revolution both parallel and diverge from those of the American and French revolutions.

C.L.R. James's magisterial *The Black Jacobins* remains one of the most nuanced accounts of the Haitian revolution, by emphasizing the complex class struggles between royalists and republicans, between white planters and free landowners of color, and between wealthy landowners and the wageless laborers who were the overwhelming majority of the population. James is also to be commended for highlighting the crucial contribution of Toussaint Louverture, the incomparable political and organizational genius of the Black Jacobins, who transformed the mass uprisings of 1791 into the national army of 1792. Through a combination of tactical discipline and charismatic leadership, Louverture leveraged Haiti's vast population of wageless laborers in much the same way Napoleon's tactical innovations and personal charisma leveraged French demography:

Toussaint alone among the black leaders, with freedom for all in his mind, was in those early months of 1792 organizing out of the thousands of ignorant and untrained blacks an army capable of fighting European troops. The insurgents had developed a method of attack based on their overwhelming numerical superiority. They did not rush forward in mass formation like fanatics. They placed themselves in groups, choosing wooded spots in such a way as to envelop their enemy, seeking to crush him by weight of numbers. They carried out their preliminary maneuvers in dead silence, while their priests (the black ones) chanted the wanga, and the women and children sang and danced in a frenzy. When these had reached the necessary height of excitement the fighters attacked. If they met with resistance they retired without exhausting themselves, but at the slightest hesitation in the defence they became extremely bold and, rushing up to the cannon, swarmed all over their opponents...

...It is characteristic of him [Louverture] that he began with a few hundred picked men, devoted himself, who learnt the art of war with him from the beginning, as they fought side by side against the French troops and the colonists. In camp he drilled and trained them assiduously. By July 1792, he had no more than five hundred attached to himself, the best of the revolutionary troops.

Louverture's momentous organizational innovation crossed the Atlantic a year later, when the Parisian crowds created their own version of the national army in 1793. Just as the combination of internal economic crisis and external warfare gradually transformed the French national army from the defensive guardian of the republic in 1793 into the engine of Napoleonic imperialism by 1799, so too would Louverture's national army gradually turn from an army of anti-colonial liberation into an army of national empire (albeit one whose military reach was limited to expeditions into Spanish-controlled San Domingo, the future Dominican Republic).

The second supercycle thus generated not one but two Napoleons, Bonaparte and Louverture. “Both [emperors] were conservative sons of the revolution,” notes Philippe Girard in his incisive study of the Haitian war of national resistance against Napoleon, “land-bound
islanders, peace-seeking warriors, pragmatic catholics, puritanical womanizers, and administrative geniuses.\textsuperscript{80} Just as Napoleon's endless wars were the necessary outcome of a national imperialism not yet backed by the economic surplus of a national capitalism, Louverture's equally endless wars of resistance were driven by the irreconcilable demands of Saint Domingue's planter elites for commercial autonomy and Saint Domingue's wageless laborers for emancipation and land.

The parallels between the dynasts can be traced back to January 21, 1793, when Louis XVI was guillotined in Paris. Spain and Portugal subsequently joined the war against revolutionary France already being waged by Austria and Prussia, while on February 1, 1793, France declared war on Great Britain and the Netherlands. The resulting continental war was the crucial enabling environment for both dynasts.

Napoleon's political and administrative skills enabled him to rise quickly in the republican ranks, and he lead the successful attack of December 19, 1793 to recapture the port city of Toulon from a British, Spanish and French royalist fleet. For his part, Louverture adroitly eluded the control of Civil Commissioner Léger-Félicité Sonthonax, the official French ruler of Saint Domingue from 1792 until 1795, by shifting his allegiance to the Spanish empire in February 1793. Louverture was also the beneficiary of the arrival of a British expeditionary force in Saint Domingue on September 20, 1793. While the British were unable to take control of the entire island, their presence prevented the French authorities from focusing their resources to crush the Haitian rebels.

Convinced that slavery had to be abandoned to construct an army capable of repulsing the British, Sonthonax issued a decree abolishing slavery in part of Saint Domingue on August 29, 1793. While wageless labor was partly abolished, it was replaced not by fully waged labor, but by sharecropping or partly waged labor. Workers were restricted to their plantations, and a share of the agrarian surplus was extracted by planters. As we shall see, this economic model later became the basis of Louverture's economic polices after 1800, very much as wartime plunder became the basis of Napoleon's rule after 1799.

When the external pressure of continental war and the internal pressure of Jacobin radicalism drove the National Convention to declare the full abolition of slavery in France and in all French colonies on February 4, 1794, Louverture returned to the French fold in May 1794. Thanks to the assistance of Louverture's army as well as the harrowing toll of mosquito-borne yellow fever, the French fought the British to an expensive stalemate. Subsequently, a French maritime expedition reconquered Saint Lucia in 1795, while slave insurrections rocked the foundations of British rule on Grenada and Saint Vincent.

Between 1795 and 1798, Louverture's deft political, military and diplomatic maneuvering vis-a-vis French officials and various emissaries of the British empire enabled him to seize dictatorial power, in a manner which recalls Napoleon's trajectory from the Italian campaigns of 1796 to his seize of dictatorial power in November 1799.\textsuperscript{81} The zenith of Louverture's rule occurred in late 1798, when the British agreed to withdraw from Saint Domingue after losing 35,000 soldiers and 13,000 sailors.\textsuperscript{82}

This was one of the worst defeats in British maritime history, and the single most revealing document of the shockwaves this defeat triggered in British elites is unquestionably Coleridge's \textit{The Rime of the Ancient Mariner} (1798). While this poem is often interpreted as a classic Romantic tale of an individual transgressor and his subsequent agonizing expiation, its
basic narrative frame is a retelling of the Haitian intervention. This is the demise of the mariner's five hundred fellow sailors at the hands of a mysterious ghost-ship and its female captain Death-in-Life, a.k.a. Haitian yellow fever. The mariner survives to tell the tale to the narrator, who is "A sadder and a wiser man" for the experience (in reality, Britain's elites would not fully learn the lesson of pursuing an integrated rather than a piecemeal naval-commercial strategy against the French empire until 1807).

Just as Napoleon's first act as dynast was to invade Saint-Domingue, a territory nominally allied to France, so too was Louverture's first act as dynast to wage war against André Rigaud, a powerful general based in the southern region of Saint-Domingue. By means of the Maitland agreement, Louverture enlisted British and US naval and military assistance to crush Rigaud's forces in 1799 and early 1800, the first official foreign military intervention by the independent United States. While Louverture succeeded in consolidating his rule over Saint-Domingue, the price tag included Louverture's betrayal of a French plan to ignite a slave insurrection on Jamaica to the British and US authorities. It is no accident that four of the most capable officers in Louverture's national army – Dessalines, Henri Christophe, Alexandre Sabès Pétion, and Jean-Pierre Boyer – would rule Haiti as dynasts in their own right. Dessalines ruled as a self-styled Napoleonic emperor from 1804 until his assassination in 1807, Christophe ruled as president from 1807 to 1811 and later as the self-proclaimed King Henry I of northern Haiti from 1811 to 1820, while Pétion ruled as President of southern Haiti from 1811 to 1818. Boyer served as President of southern Haiti between 1818 and 1820, and as President of a reunified Haiti from 1820 to 1843.

The fundamental internal contradiction of Louverture's rule was his reliance on a system of partly waged labor with similarities to Austrian and Russian serfdom, as well as to the post-1833 regimes of indenture and sharecropping in the British Caribbean. Louverture's labor code, enacted by decree in October 1800, was intended to preserve as much of the traditional plantation system as possible. Girard points out that this modified sharecropping system served the class interests of a nonwhite planter elite at the expense of the wageless and partly waged laborers – and especially the laboring women – who had fought so long and hard for the revolution:

By order of General Louverture, all former field slaves, even those who had settled in urban areas during the Revolution, would return to their original plantations, sometimes under their former masters. Those who refused would be 'arrested and punished as severely as soldiers', which implied that plantation runaways could be shot as deserters. He thereby merged the two worlds he knew best – the sugar plantation and the army camp – into a kind of military-agricultural complex.

Although women had been a minority on prerevolutionary plantations, they now formed the bulk of the labor force. The reason was that so many men had died in the Revolution or were still serving in the army. The demographic shift was not lost on Louverture, who went out of his way to use both the masculine and the feminine versions of the French word for 'cultivator' in his labor code. He expressly forbade female field hands from entering army camps, presumably so they could not forge alliances with
the men charged with enforcing the new labor laws. He also railed against women who moved to town and cities to live of 'libertinage'. Equal work did not bring equal pay: when the plantation's crop was distributed as salary, female field hands received two-thirds of the share their male counterparts got. Women were also denied the higher-paying jobs, such as sugar refiner (which paid double the usual male share) and foreman (three shares)....

...In February 1801, Louverture banned land sales of fewer than 50 carreaux (about 160 acres) to prevent plantation laborers from establishing subsistence farms. More regulations followed. In July, he declared that cultivators, who had once been able to sign one-year (then three-year) contracts and change employers, would now have to work on the same plantation for life, which essentially turned them into serfs. In September, he decreed that cultivators would need his personal authorization before marrying someone from another plantation, a rule that had been in place under the Old Regime. 88

This labor code did not succeed in resurrecting the plantation system, but it did succeed in disastrously undercutting Louverture's political support among Haiti's wageless and partly waged laborers. The next two Haitian dynasts made equally unsuccessful attempts to impose this sharecropping model on Haitians, until the fourth dynast, Boyer, recognized the futility of the endeavor and legalized small-scale subsistence farming in the 1820s.

Louverture's own rule as dynast was cut short when he gave himself the title of Governor-General for Life on July 8, 1801, a direct political challenge to Napoleon. Interestingly, Napoleon briefly toyed with the possibility of a friendly codominium with Louverture:

“With an army of twenty-five to thirty thousand blacks, what might I [Napoleon] not undertake against Jamaica, the Antilles, Canada, the United States itself, or the Spanish colonies?” France should renew its commitment to emancipation, he explained in 1800, because “this island would go for England if the blacks were not attached to us by their interest in liberty.” “They will produce less sugar, maybe, than they did as slaves; but they will produce it for us, and will serve us, if we need them, as soldiers. We will have one less sugar mill; but we will have one more citadel filled with friendly soldiers.” 89

Instead, Napoleon dispatched Leclerc's expedition in 1802 with orders to arrest Louverture and subjugate Saint Domingue. This act would have two significant consequences for the second supercycle. The first and most obvious one was the catastrophic weakening of the French navy prior to the decisive naval battle of Trafalgar in 1805. The scale of the maritime resources devoted to the expedition was stupendous, comprising two-thirds of the entire French navy. 90

The second and equally important consequence was that Napoleon threw away any chance of refounding the French Americas, by failing to deploy the sole weapon which might have seriously damaged the British empire. This was the ideology of abolitionism. The full allegiance of Saint Domingue would have given the Napoleonic empire an impregnable Caribbean base, as well as a highly-motivated land army which might have been deployed in Louisiana or against British plantations in the Caribbean.

Instead of pioneering the strategy of revolutionary abolitionism, Napoleon doubled down on imperial revanchism. There is a striking irony in the fact that Napoleon's revanchism was mirrored by the revanchism of Louverture's rule. When large numbers of emancipated wageless
laborers with significant military experience returned home in 1799, they rebelled against Louverture's sharecropping regime and demanded land for subsistence farming. Louverture's own nephew, Moyse, led an uprising of these wageless laborers in the northern region of Saint Domingue in 1801. Louverture crushed the uprising with extreme brutality, executing an estimated 5,000 cultivators along with Moyse himself. This alienated much of the northern populace, at the same moment that his war against Rigaud had alienated much of the population of southern Saint Domingue. As a result, Louverture had few allies willing to fight for his rule when Leclerc's expedition arrived in December 1801. After months of skirmishes and a tenuous ceasefire, Louverture was captured in May 1802, almost surely with the connivance of Dessalines. Interned in France, Louverture passed away on April 7, 1803.

With Louverture out of the picture, Dessalines reconstituted the Haitian national army with the assistance of Louverture's other former officers and launched a ferociously effective guerilla war. Catastrophic French losses due to yellow fever, the well-honed tactics and strategic unity of the Haitian army, and a blockade by British naval forces forced the French to depart in December 1803. The scale of the French defeat was comparable in its scope only to the fallout of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812:

Hospital records were poorly kept due to the violence of the yellow fever epidemic, but an incomplete register lists at least 32,000 dead (soldiers and sailors) in 1802-1803 and reliable accounts put the total death toll on the French side at 50 to 60,000. The navy alone lost 8,000 sailors; when taking into account normal death rates in the navy, the expedition directly led to the loss of 6,000 sailors. There were only 80,000 sailors in all of France during that period, so the expedition diminished France's seafaring population by up to ten percent, an incredible amount for a single expedition (by comparison, French and Spanish losses at Trafalgar totaled 4,400).

One of the signal lessons of the Haitian debacle is that Napoleon's revanchism was never random or arbitrary, but followed a logical historical pattern. It would always begin with a maritime gamble in an attempt to match or surpass the British empire. When this gamble failed due to a combination of local resistance and superior British naval capacity, Napoleon compensated by means of a land-based or continental political gamble. This continental gamble usually succeeded, but generated so many additional contradictions that it became necessary to launch an even bigger maritime gamble. This latter would fail, necessitating an even bigger continental gamble, and so forth.

When Napoleon's 1798 maritime gamble in Egypt failed, he responded with the continental gamble of the coup of the Eighteenth Brumaire. However, the inherent contradictions of his reign as First Consul led Napoleon to launch the 1802 maritime gamble of Saint Domingue. When this failed even more spectacularly, he responded with the continental gamble of the republican emperor, culminating in his coronation on December 2, 1804 as Emperor of the French.

The inherent contradictions of a republican emperor attempting to rule without a British-style imperial republic led Napoleon to launch his October 1805 maritime gamble of Trafalgar. When this ended in the annihilation of the combined French and Spanish fleets, Napoleon
responded with yet another continental political gamble – the military campaigns which defeated the Austrian, Prussian and Russian empires in the battles of Austerlitz (December 2, 1805), Jena-Auerstedt (October 14, 1806), Preussisch-Eylau (February 7-8, 1807) and Friedland (June 14, 1807).

At the zenith of its geopolitical power in 1807, the Napoleonic empire had cowed its Austrian and Russian competitors, partly dismembered Prussia, and installed proxy regimes on the territories of the future Belgium, numerous small German states, and on much of Italy, Switzerland, and the United Provinces. Yet the inability of the Napoleonic empire to manage the resulting economic and political contradictions of its conquests – the ineluctable reality that a regime of financial plunder generated nothing but economic stagnation and ever-increasing popular antagonism – drove Napoleon towards his fourth and greatest maritime gamble, the one which would literally and figuratively shipwreck his empire.

This gamble was the Continental System, a zone of economic autarky intended to bankrupt British merchants while filling the coffers of the Napoleonic state. On November 21, 1806, Napoleon issued the Berlin Decree, banning all British trade with continental Europe. This was supplemented by the Milan Decree of December 17, 1807, banning neutral trade with Britain.

This greatest of all maritime gambles was intended to showcase insuperable strength. Instead, it revealed irreparable weakness. The trade embargo was a dead letter without the participation of Portugal and Spain, the centers of two vast maritime colonies. However, Portugal had been a staunch ally of Britain since 1664, while the Spanish crown insisted on its sovereignty. Consequently, Napoleon invaded Portugal with a combination of French soldiers and Spanish proxy troops on November 19, 1807.

The invasion backfired by igniting a popular Portuguese uprising against the French invaders. When the anti-French uprising began to spread to Spain, Napoleon was forced to openly occupy Spain on February 16, 1808, and went so far as to install Joseph Bonaparte, his brother, as the Spanish monarch on June 8, 1808. Since neither Joseph nor the French invaders had any local legitimacy, the Spanish waged a protracted and brutal guerilla war against the occupation, the five-year Peninsular War.

Between 1808 and 1813, Britain’s absolute control of the oceans, its economic capacity to arm and finance its allies, and the mountainous terrain of the Iberian peninsula enabled a combination of British expeditionary troops and British-supplied Portuguese and Spanish irregular forces to fight the French occupiers to a bloody draw. Far from making war pay for war, the Napoleonic empire eventually had to station 350,000 soldiers at enormous cost just to hold limited areas of Portugal and Spain. The horrific violence of this war was famously documented by Francisco Goya, who almost single-handedly invented the genre of wartime photojournalism in his *The Disasters of War* prints.95

The Napoleonic occupation had one other significant geopolitical consequence. By disrupting the maritime links between Spain and its colonies, it inadvertently detonated the third wave of the revolutions of the second supercycle. After the American, Dutch, Belgian and French uprisings and revolutions of 1775-1789, and after the Caribbean uprisings and Haitian revolution of 1791-1816, came the Central and South American uprisings and wars of national independence of 1810-1824.
It is worth emphasizing that 1807 marked a genuine turning point of the second supercycle, comparable to France's full entrance into the Thirty Years War in 1635, or the full entrance of the Soviet Union and the United States into World War II in 1941. Simply, 1807 was the year the British empire finally began to counter Napoleon's maritime and continental gambles with a new type of hegemony. This hegemony was the rule of the world's first truly planetary credit market.

We have already seen how the Hapsburg hegemony was a speculation on the world's first planetary financial system, a.k.a. the export of American silver to Chinese consumers, and how the Dutch-French co-hegemony was a speculation on the world's first planetary corporation (the VOC). But whereas the Napoleonic empire placed its bets on speculative military gambles, the British empire bet on the principle of speculation itself. Put bluntly, where Napoleon launched the biggest continental wars in human history, Britain launched the biggest debt issuance and credit servicing operation in world history.

At the core of this British strategy was an innovative compromise with the Atlantic radicalisms. When the Napoleonic empire failed to grasp the political and economic implications of abolitionism in 1802, the British empire seized them by means of the British parliamentary decision to abolish the trans-Atlantic slave trade on March 25, 1807.

The primary motivation for trade abolition was not ethics, but geopolitics. By 1807, the British navy had seized complete control of the world's oceanic trading flows from its maritime competitors (the one partial exception, namely the trade intermediated by the merchants of the United States, complemented rather than threatened British hegemony). In the context of this naval hegemony, the abolition of the slave trade was a major political victory for two distinct social groups.

The first and most obvious group was the wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers of the United States, the Caribbean and South America. While the complete abolition of Atlantic chattel slavery would take another eight decades of political struggle, trade abolition fundamentally destabilized the entire system of American wageless labor by increasing labor costs. This was a crucial step in the historical transition away from a world-system comprised primarily of wageless and partly waged labor, and towards one based on partly waged and fully waged labor.

To be sure, increased labor costs reduced the profitability of Britain's Caribbean planters over the short term. Yet this was a small price to pay compared to the immense geopolitical advantage gleaned by pulling the economic rug from beneath every single one of Britain's leading maritime rivals. The southern states of the US, Portugal's Brazilian colony, and Spain's Caribbean colonies all specialized in exports of agricultural goods produced by wageless labor.

The abolition of the slave trade was both a foundational moment of modern international law, as well as one of Britain's most astute post-mercantilist business strategies. It is no accident that the British strategy had been largely anticipated by the US Slave Trade Acts of 1794 and 1800. These acts prohibited US citizens from owning or equipping slave vessels, though foreign merchants were still permitted to do so. In fact, the US Congress abolished the trade completely on US territory via the Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves on March 2, 1807, three weeks prior to the British trade abolition.

This cross-Atlantic parallelism helps to explain the motivations of the second group which benefited from abolition. This was a new set of northern US and British capitalist elites.
whose class interests were radically divergent from those of the planters or land-owning gentry. These new elites extracted profits not from a combination of wageless and partly waged labor, but from a combination of partly waged and fully waged laborers. Where the mercantilists of the Dutch-French epoch sought trading monopolies, this new Anglo-American elite sought investment opportunities; where the former sought new lands to plunder, the latter sought new infrastructure projects to build; where the former sought new bodies to enserf and enslave, the latter sought new bodies to exploit.

This post-1807 coalition of convenience between wageless, partly waged and fully waged laborers and British and northern US capitalist elites was also crucial to the four major Central and South American insurrections of 1810, launching the third and final round of anticolonial wars of national independence in the closing days of the second supercycle. These insurrections included the May Revolution in Buenos Aires, Argentina (May 18 to May 25, 1810), the flower vase incident of Bogota, Colombia on July 20, 1810, the Cry of Dolores [Grito de Dolores] by Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla in Dolores Hidalgo, Mexico, on September 16, 1810, and finally the Cabildo (city hall meeting) of Santiago, Chile on September 18, 1810.

We will examine the Central and South American revolutions more closely in the next chapter, since their trajectory is closely linked to the post-1815 British hegemony. For now, it is worth pointing out the powerful effects of the post-1807 conjuncture on the cultural sphere. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* (1808), and Goethe's play *Faust, Part I* (1808) all reprise the contradictions of the Napoleonic empire at its geopolitical zenith in the material of European musical tonality and German-language drama, respectively.

What these seemingly disparate works share is the triumph of national imperial energy over a henceforth retrograde provincialism. This triumph is as ambivalent and fragile as its underlying class coalition. All three works are dazzling Napoleonic gambles on the boundless possibilities of some future national form, as well as pragmatic investments in the secure returns of a British national audience.

Hegel's Spirit transcends the provincial strictures of Kantian reason in much the same way that the Prussian entrepreneurs who, grown unexpectedly rich on war contracts, decide to invest their speculative gains in landholdings guaranteed by a newly reformist Prussian state (serfdom was abolished by decree on October 9, 1807) rather than in risky textile mills. Similarly, the power-packed thesis of the *Fifth Symphony's* eight-note opening motif and the antithesis of this motif's subsequent development unleashes an acoustic dynamism unimaginable to Mozart's melodic-orchestral syntheses, but this revolution of national musical form does not yet have the national content exhibited by the 19th century works of Poland's Chopin or Germany's Schumann. In like manner, Goethe's *Faust, Part I* – Goethe's epic aesthetic self-confession – soars to the majestic heights of the national cultural entrepreneur, but cannot wholly absolve this speculation from the criminal real estate swindle on which it was founded: Faust reaches for the stars, while Gretchen dies in jail.

Some of the most striking documents of the internal contradictions of the 1807 watershed are the immediate successor works of these thinkers and artists. Hegel's *Science of Logic* (1811), Beethoven's *Sixth Symphony* (1808), and Goethe's novel *Elective Affinities* (1809) are all magnificent reversion of the Napoleonic gamble to the British mean. In the sphere of philosophy, the world-soul on horseback Hegel once glimpsed in the guise of Napoleon did not usher in the age of liberty, equality and fraternity, but instead heralded the mundane Prussian
“Gewerbefreiheit” (freedom of occupation) laws of 1810-1811, which transformed the medieval guilds into contractual bodies.99 This has its musical counterpart in the striking contrast between the anguished grandeur of the Fifth Symphony and the providential pastorale of the Sixth, whose skillfully orchestrated bird calls, peasant dances and summer thunderstorm cannot quite hide the underlying diminution of musical tension. Without an archaic, semi-feudal musical structure to struggle against and overcome, the tension between musical dissonances and cadences disappears: the Fifth Symphony rages at injustice, whereas the Sixth Symphony merely flees from the transient anger of the otherwise benevolent Austrian dynast.

In like manner, Goethe's Elective Affinities grants its male characters egress from the violent passions of the epoch of storm and stress, but cannot endow its female characters with the democratic subjectivity of the partly waged female laborers of Austen's first great novel, Sense and Sensibility (1811). Whereas the poems and political engagements of the British Romantics personified by Byron, Coleridge and Shelley were the dreams of an achieved nation-state nostalgic for the provincial idyll, the Logic, the Sixth Symphony and Elective Affinities are the philosophical, musical and textual dreams of German-speaking regions wishing they could become full-fledged nation-states.

The final piece of the geopolitical puzzle of the second supercycle is why British elites felt they could gamble everything in 1807 on partly waged and fully waged labor. The reason was that they had already hedged their bets with an additional collateral, one which ensured that they were betting on a sure thing. This collateral was the labor-power of South Asia.

This latter benefited the British empire in three ways. First, the English East India Company (EIC) and private British traders extracted vast amounts of wealth from South Asia via direct plunder and maritime trade. P.J. Marshall sums up the crucial role of Bengal in financing the British empire after 1765:

Bengal's wealth, easily tapped through its sophisticated revenue system, had long made it a supremely desirable object for conquest. So long as they were maintained, Bengal remittances of bullion to Delhi had been the main financial prop of the Mughal emperors. Bengal revenue quickly became the main prop of the British in India, providing most of the tribute in goods to London, financing much of the China trade and enabling the Madras and Bombay presidencies to fight their wars.100

Just as American silver did not directly defray the costs of the Hapsburg court, but provided the collateral for the Genoese loans which financed Hapsburg expansionism, so too did the financial plunder extracted directly from South Asia and the trading rents extracted from almost every single major node of world maritime trade provide the essential collateral for Britain's massive expansion of public debt. Javier Cuenca-Estaban has provided this account of the importance of Asia-related plunder and trading rents:

In 1765-1812 a trade [i.e. total maritime trade between Asia and Britain] that seldom employed more than 3 per cent of British tonnage, to bring 17 per cent of total imports retained for home consumption, somehow supplied 24 per cent of net customs and excise revenue on worldwide imports. The direct
contribution of Asian goods to British finances was largest at both ends of the period and appears to have grown during the French wars. At a time of rising total revenue in nominal and real terms, with increasing reliance on import taxes to more than one third of Britain's total tax receipts by the 1780s, by 1803-12 the relevant Asian shares would have reached 25 per cent of Britain's net receipts on worldwide imports, or 8.4 per cent of net tax income as a whole.101

Second, the EIC's victory in the 1757 battle of Plassey gave the British empire access to practically inexhaustible supplies of high-quality saltpeter, a.k.a. crystallized potassium nitrate, an essential and scarce ingredient of early modern gunpowder. Thanks to South Asian saltpeter, British cannon and musket fire was consistently more powerful and deadly than that of its major geopolitical competitors for the duration of the second supercycle.102 This enabled smaller numbers of British troops to hold their own against much larger land armies, and greatly boosted the military effectiveness of British allies. Most important of all, it gave the British empire an overwhelming edge in naval warfare. Nelson's victory at Trafalgar was the collective achievement of the fully waged laborers of the British shipyards, the emancipated wageless laborers of Saint Domingue who fought Napoleon's expeditionary army to a standstill, and the partly waged laborers of South Asia who harvested and loaded saltpeter onto British ships.

Third, South Asia was the crucial testing and training ground for Britain's most effective strategies of imperial expansion. While the Second Anglo-Mysore War of 1780-1784 was inconclusive, the Third Anglo-Mysore War of 1789-1792 and the Second Marathan War of 1803-1805 were both decisive British victories. The EIC's key innovation was to incorporate the preexisting revenue collection machinery of the Marathan and Mughal empires into its own accounts, in what amounted to a far more successful variant of Napoleon's strategy of making war pay for war.

Part of this revenue stream was repatriated by private British merchants, significantly boosting effective demand in the British economy, while part was utilized to assemble a vast army of indigenous soldiers who would provide the backbone of British imperial authority for decades to come. As late as 1749, the EIC maintained only 3,000 troops in India. However, by 1763 this number had skyrocketed to 26,000, and by 1778 the total reached 67,000.103 C.A. Bayly estimates the company's forces would mushroom again to 115,000 in 1789, and to 155,000 by 1805.

The EIC's wars of company-state expansionism were crucial to the emergence of Britain's most capable military leaders, most famously Arthur Wellesley, the future Lord Wellington:

After 1790 the pace of British military expansion in India speeded up notably. Between 1789 and 1805 the Company's total strength increased from about 115,000 to 155,000, making it one of the largest European-style standing armies in the world. More important, the Company, which had been at the mercy of Indian light horse in earlier wars, created a strong cavalry arm. Not only were the numbers of cavalry tripled but the state itself provided horse and arms, a system which was imposed on Britain's tributary allies over the next generation. Indian troopers who owned their own mounts had been reluctant to risk them in close encounters. The importance of cavalry was two-fold: first, it protected and helped supply cumbersome infantry and artillery columns; secondly, it made possible quick pursuit and control over a fractious countryside...
Another major improvement in the Company's army can be attributed directly to Arthur Wellesley. No formal commissary's department concerned with feeding and supplying the army was constituted until the following decades. But Wellesley insisted on detailed control and regular payment of the vast private enterprise of pack-bullock herds which attended Indian armies. By this means he was able to ensure the provision of fodder for and transport of the long-range field guns which he regarded as so crucial for success in battle. Clearing large swathes of jungle and building roads into the eyries of rebellious Nayar chieftains, Arthur Wellesley also pioneered the use of ecological warfare by Europeans against Asians. In turn success brought greater efficiency. The defeat of Tipu in 1799 left in the Company's hands nearly 250,000 strong white Mysorean draught cattle which proved vital in the Deccan campaigns of the following decade.\textsuperscript{104}

Roger Morriss estimates that the total strength of the East India Company reached a maximum of 160,000 soldiers by 1815.\textsuperscript{105} In addition to South Asian soldiers, the EIC also employed large numbers of British citizens. At its peak, the EIC employed 1,000 civil and medical servants, 20,000 troops, 15,000 employees in the maritime sector, 2,500 staffers in Britain itself, and an additional 55,000 contractors, suppliers, merchants, skilled workers, and other individuals. The company workforce of 93,500 was comparable to the size of the entire British navy, whose official headcount was 105,000 in 1804 (this latter figure which does not include the 20,000 naval employees of the EIC).\textsuperscript{106}

The EIC also played a crucial role in mobilizing the talents of British and South Asian shipwrights alike to ensure British naval hegemony. The two most famous examples are Gabriel Snodgrass, master shipwright of the EIC, and Jamsetjee Bomanjee Wadia, master shipwright of the East India Company's dock in Mumbai:

The most important innovations of these years were in building practice rather than design. The shortage of compass timber and knees, and the urgent need to strengthen older ships for extended lives, led to the adoption of a number of novelties from Gabriel Snodgrass, master shipwright of the East India Company, especially the use of diagonal riders, bolted down in the hold over the existing structure of old ships to stiffen the frames. This in turn was an essential element of the 'system' adopted by Robert Seppings, Surveyor of the Navy from 1813 to 1832, whose diagonal timbering allowed new ships of much greater length to be built without loss of rigidity. Also during the Napoleonic Wars many knees were replaced by iron plates bolted through simple chocks (wooden blocks). 'Wall-sided' ships, with vertical topsides rather than the traditional tumblehome, saved on compass timber for the toptimbers, gave more room within board, greater stability at large angles of heel, and a better spread for the rigging. Shortage of timber inspired the softwood-built 'fir frigates', which were light and fast but had very short working lives. More successful was the building of ships in teak at Bombay Dockyard during the Napoleonic War. Though difficult and expensive to work, teak is a superb shipbuilding timber which is virtually immune to rot and amenable to iron fastenings. During the lifetime of the master shipwright Jamsetjee Bomanjee the management and quality of workmanship of Bombay yard was very high, but after his death in 1821 the building programme was brought to an end by mismanagement, corruption, and the exhaustion of the Malabar teak forests.\textsuperscript{107}

Jamsetjee Bomanjee was later memorialized by painter J.D. Dorman in 1830:
This ensemble of British and South Asian managerial talent, when combined with Britain's near-monopoly on world trade rents, generated the critical mass necessary for self-sustaining industrial growth at almost exactly the same moment that the Napoleonic empire ran out of fresh European polities to plunder. Whereas Napoleon's continental military gambles between 1799 and 1807 were able to compensate for failed maritime gambles by recourse to French
demographics, every single continental gamble after 1808 ran into the problem of limited finances and demographic scarcity.

The occupation of Spain and ongoing war with Portugal was a massive financial drain on the French economy, and tied down significant amounts of French soldiers. Meanwhile, the French proxy regimes which administered the Belgian, Dutch and Central European economies tended to inhibit domestic growth, by preventing them from openly trading with the fast-growing British economy. The result was stagnation, rampant smuggling, and significant capital flight from continental European markets (especially from Dutch investors) to the British economy.

This flight capital, combined with financial plunder from South Asia and the additional revenues of near-total maritime hegemony, stabilized Britain's national debt at low rates of interest, enabling the British empire to outspend Napoleon's war machine. Conversely, Austria's defeat and Prussia's partial dismemberment generated minimal financial rewards for the Napoleonic empire, and required the costly deployment of large numbers of expeditionary soldiers.

From a geopolitical perspective, Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 was the logical culmination of every single one of his continental gambles since the 1808 invasion of Portugal. There was literally no other major land power in Europe left to invade, since the British controlled the Baltic and Mediterranean oceans and could thus protect the Swedish and Ottoman empires from France. The invasion accelerated the timeline of Napoleon's downfall, but it did not set the process in motion.

The basic contradiction of the Napoleonic empire was that it had to constantly expand, but the more it grew, the weaker it became. Napoleon's political rule was unviable in all non-French territories, while Napoleonomics was fundamentally uncompetitive vis-a-vis the textile-powered capitalism of the British empire. The geographic expansion of the French empire between 1799 and 1809 meant that the potential pool of soldiers available to the anti-French coalition was at least three times as large as the comparable number of French soldiers. By 1812, half of Napoleon's invasion force of 690,000 soldiers consisted of non-French recruits, who were sufficiently cognizant of their own identities and polities to refuse to fight to the death for what they perceived as a foreign ruler.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia was thus the dramatically compressed version of the equally disastrous five-year occupation of Spain. Both invasions began with initial French successes against numerically inferior foes, tactical victories which did not yield any strategic long-term advantage. They were followed by increasing logistical difficulties and the unpleasant discovery that the occupied country had few financial resources to plunder. Finally, both invasions descended into costly and protracted guerilla wars, culminating in defeat at the hands of a combination of guerilla forces and British-supported regular armies.

While Austria, Prussia and Russia provided the majority of the soldiers who eventually defeated Napoleon's armies, the crucial financial, managerial and logistical engine of victory was British industrialization. Titanic levels of war spending, the world's biggest national debt, control of the world's oceans, and the vast empire created by the East Indies Company were all crucial to jumpstarting the Industrial Revolution in Britain.

The clearest evidence for this is the stupendous growth of the British textile industry. Javier Cuenca-Esteban estimates that British textile exports almost tripled in size between 1787 and 1820, whereas French exports increased by only 40%:
Table 4. Period averages of British vs. French textile exports in thousands of British pounds at 1787 constant prices, 1787-1820.¹⁰⁹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1787-1789</th>
<th>1797-1812, 1814-1815</th>
<th>1816-1820</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>British exports</td>
<td>17,846</td>
<td>34,297</td>
<td>50,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French exports</td>
<td>10,617</td>
<td>12,487</td>
<td>13,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British cotton manufactures, exports as percent total</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French cotton manufactures, exports as percent total</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British exports to colonies, percent all exports</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French exports to colonies, percent all exports</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The twin pillars of Britain's export boom were increased demand from British colonies, as well as demand from the United States (British exports to the US in were 14.4% of the total in 1787-1789 and rose to 21.1% during 1797-1815). US demand fell slightly to a respectable 17.2% in 1816-1820, primarily due to strong demand from continental Europe after the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. Primed with this extra demand, the output of Britain's textile industry skyrocketed from 5.2 million pounds in 1781 to 56 million by 1800.¹¹⁰

We will examine the critical role of the British textile industry in forging the 19th century world-system more closely in the next chapter, but for now it is worth emphasizing the degree to which British industrialization determined the eventual geopolitical outcome of the second supercycle. This industrialization explains why the two major geopolitical winners of the second supercycle, namely the British and Russian empires, were structurally complementary rather than antagonistic to each other.¹¹¹ Britain, the world's mightiest maritime power, compensated for the loss of its thirteen North American colonies in 1783 by annexing the Marathan and Mughal empires, by developing the world's most creditworthy and productive economy, and by conquering the world's oceans. Simply, British naval and commercial expansionism did not overlap or clash to any significant degree with the land-based expansionism of the Russian empire.

By 1815, the Russian empire had become the de facto military co-hegemon of continental Europe, by swallowing much of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between 1773 and 1795 and annexing Finland from Sweden in 1809.¹¹² Where the British empire's overwhelming economic wealth and naval gave it the capacity to intervene in any continental European conflict...
whenever it wished, the Russian empire had a similar advantage, due to its vast demographic base and the unassailable geography of its Eurasian hinterland.\textsuperscript{113} To be sure, this military hegemony did not extend to the realm of cultural or economics, due to the fact that the empire's ethnic Russian core lacked the economic dynamism of its Baltic, Polish and Ukrainian territories.\textsuperscript{114} The result was that the Russian empire functioned between 1815 and 1853 more as Britain's gendarme in continental affairs, rather than as an entirely independent actor in its own right.

Perhaps the clearest example of the importance of British industrialization was the lenient treatment of post-Napoleonic France. Far from being partitioned or subject to ruinous postwar indemnities, France was allowed to retain its 1790 borders and was reintegrated into the henceforth hegemonic British order. Nor did this strategy change in the slightest after Napoleon's brief return from exile in 1815. The Seventh Coalition crushed Napoleon's forces with even greater dispatch and efficiency than the Sixth, and the subsequent indemnity imposed on France was only 700 million francs (£28 million), the equivalent of about one-third of France's 1813 tax revenues. This sum was quickly paid off by the restored Bourbon monarchy, through a series of loans helpfully placed by British banks.

This leniency was not an act of benevolence. It was a masterful geopolitical strategy, with direct parallels to the relative lenience shown by the United States vis-a-vis the defeated Axis powers after WW II. The goal of the Congress of Vienna was to fundamentally transform the polities of continental Europe in much the same way the Dutch transformed the polity of England in 1688. Its two most important achievements were the precedence of constitutional monarchs and constitutional oligarchies over dynastic lineages in continental Europe, and the tactical compromise by British elites with the class interests of Caribbean, European, North American, South American and South Asian partly waged and fully waged laborers otherwise known as abolitionism.

To see how this worked, consider the major political outcomes of 1815. Constitutional monarchs returned to power in France and in the Netherlands, Switzerland was granted full sovereignty, while Napoleon's proxy regime, the Confederation of the Rhine, was replaced by the thirty-eight member German Confederation (two of which were Austria and Prussia). Nor is it an accident that British diplomats inserted Act XV into the Treaty of Vienna, an article which roundly condemned the Atlantic slave trade.\textsuperscript{115} The Austrian, Prussian and Russian empires had no qualms signing the final document, since Prussia had abolished serfdom in 1807 and neither Austria nor Russia had ant stake in the Atlantic slave trade. Article XV was not aimed at these land-based empires, but was meant to buttress Britain's naval hegemony vis-a-vis the Portuguese, Spanish and US empires. As part of this strategy, British elites later begin to recognize the independence of the South American republics, reducing the power of the Spanish empire while enabling British merchants to extract trading rents from South American markets.

To summarize, the post-1815 British long peace reconfigured the three pillars of the Dutch-French co-hegemony, namely Dutch financial strength, Dutch naval power, and French demographic abundance, into a qualitatively new strategy. This strategy relied on the economics of commercial integration and the politics of national imperial expansionism, rather than the economics of maritime mercantilism and the politics of dynastic expansionism. The first application of this strategy was the resolution of the remaining post-Napoleonic territorial disputes of the various European empires. As undisputed naval hegemon, as the main financier
of the anti-Napoleonic coalitions, and as a primarily maritime empire with no significant claims on continental European territories, Britain could credibly play the role of neutral arbiter in these disputes.

Thanks to its efforts, Austria was forced to cede Belgium to the Netherlands, but was compensated with territories in Italy and southern Germany. Meanwhile, Prussia’s territory expanded to include Saxony, the province of the Rhine, and Westphalia, making it a second-tier geopolitical power about as powerful as the United Provinces but not powerful enough to challenge Austria or Russia. Russia retained its acquisitions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Finland, and was henceforth ranked as one of the great powers of Europe (the others being Britain, France, Austria and an enlarged Prussia).

British elites followed a similar logic by returning the territories of Belgium and Indonesia to the control of the Netherlands. This bought the allegiance of Dutch elites to the British hegemony, while also creating a British-allied buffer state on France’s northern border. To be sure, Britain did not return South Africa or Sri Lanka to the Dutch, due to the strategic importance of these latter as gateways to the Indian and Pacific oceans.

One of the most striking expressions of the onset of the British hegemony was the extraordinary outpouring of aesthetic masterpieces which appeared at the conclusion of the second supercycle. This crescendo includes Austen’s *Mansfield Park* (1814) and *Emma* (1815), Beethoven’s *Seventh Symphony* (1812) and *Fidelio* (1814), and Nguyễn Du’s *The Tale of Kiều* (1813), the classic verse novel of Vietnam and the supreme lyric achievement of its time.

These works embody the extraordinary tension between subjects who have some of the characteristics of partly waged and fully waged laborers, but who are locked into conflict with the cultural order and political institutions of dynastic expansionisms. Austen's female laborers navigate the vagaries of the British marriage market with the weapons of deadpan irony and mordant wit, Beethoven's Austrian soldiers march in anti-Napoleonic coalition armies, while Nguyễn's female protagonist is sent into exile by a dynastic-revolutionary upheaval in late 18th century Vietnam, much like the literati class she symbolizes. Beneath their momentary utopian cadences of individual freedom and eventual social reconciliation, these works of art seethe with the harrowing experience of unfreedom and negativity. This bravura passage in Austen’s *Mansfield Park* is a case in point:

The houses, though scarcely half a mile apart, were not within sight of each other; but, by walking fifty yards from the hall door, she could look down the park, and command a view of the Parsonage and all its demesnes, gently rising beyond the village road; and in Dr. Grant’s meadow she immediately saw the group – Edmund and Miss Crawford both on horse-back, riding side by side, Dr. and Mrs. Grant, and Mr. Crawford, with two or three grooms, standing about and looking on. A happy party it appeared to her, all interested in one object: cheerful beyond a doubt, for the sound of merriment ascended even to her. It was a sound which did not make her cheerful; she wondered that Edmund should forget her, and felt a pang. She could not turn her eyes from the meadow; she could not help watching all that passed. At first Miss Crawford and her companion made the circuit of the field, which was not small, at a foot’s pace; then, at her apparent suggestion, they rose into a canter; and to Fanny’s timid nature it was most astonishing to see how well she sat. After a few minutes they stopped entirely. Edmund was close to her; he was speaking to her; he was evidently directing her management of the bridle; he had hold of her hand; she saw it, or the imagination supplied what the eye could not reach. She must not wonder at all this; what could be more natural than that Edmund should be making himself useful, and proving his good-nature by any one? She
could not but think, indeed, that Mr. Crawford might as well have saved him the trouble; that it would have been particularly proper and becoming in a brother to have done it himself; but Mr. Crawford, with all his boasted good-nature, and all his coachmanship, probably knew nothing of the matter, and had no active kindness in comparison of Edmund. She began to think it rather hard upon the mare to have such double duty; if she were forgotten, the poor mare should be remembered.116

The Napoleonic battlefield inspection famously glimpsed by Hegel has become Wellington's appraising glance, as dynastic time falls into market space: the new social relations which enabled Wellington to coordinate the movement of infantry and logistics on a continental scale have their counterpart in the new subjectivities (“she could not help watching all that passed”) of partly waged female laborers, who gaze upon the mating rituals of the mid-level British gentry with ferocious irony. The surcharge of this irony arcs between the twin italicizations of “
her
” – the first refers to Fanny Price's internal mood, while the second refers to Lady Crawford's external performance – like the Hegelian thunderbolt between the Kantian subjective intuition and the objective appearance. In the glare of this thunderbolt, Fanny momentarily grasps the bitter truth that both she and Lady Crawford are, just like the poor mare, beasts of burden, objects of imperial accumulation strategies.

Where Austen's female protagonists struggle for autonomy against British imperial capitalism with the newly-forged weapons of female solidarity and sisterhood, the slow adagio of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony mourns the battlefield carnage of the second supercycle with a degree of journalistic detail unknown to previous musical works, and where Fidelio’s denunciation of market despotism anticipates centuries of human rights struggles to come, Nguyen's verse novel delivers an extraordinary dual critique of East Asia's sophisticated mercantile and dynastic expansionisms, as well as of the modes of patriarchal domination of women at all levels of the early modern world-system.

All of these works resonate with the power of the determinate negation: marriage is an iron machine, victory is mourning, the dynastic literati are brothel-slaves. Yet these works do not give in to despair or reaction. By holding fast to the principle of negativity, these works point in the direction of the social struggles of the future. While the greatest revolutions and most far-reaching liberation struggles of the second supercycle could never do more than momentarily overcome their geopolitical limitations, they opened the door to the mass movements of partly waged and fully waged workers, the struggles of landless and pauperized peasants, the uprisings of colonized peoples and the struggles of women which would erupt like recurrent earthquakes during the 19th century. To understand these mass movements and their relationship to the geopolitical contradictions of the British long peace, we must turn to the next chapter.
### Appendix 2

**Major Geopolitical Conflicts of the Second Supercycle 1775-1815**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma vs. Thailand</td>
<td>1775-1776</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman empire vs. Persian empire</td>
<td>1775-1776</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (plus France 1778-1783 and Spain 1779-1783) vs. Britain</td>
<td>1775-1783</td>
<td>US independence, Spain acquires Florida, France acquires Louisiana territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain vs. Mysore (Second Anglo-Mysore War)</td>
<td>1780-1784</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma vs. Thailand</td>
<td>1785-1786</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma vs. Thailand</td>
<td>1787</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman empire vs. Russian empire</td>
<td>1787-1792</td>
<td>Russian victory, limited territorial gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden vs. Russian empire</td>
<td>1788-1790</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain, Hyderabad, Marathan empire, Travancore vs. Mysore (Third Anglo-Mysore War)</td>
<td>1789-1792</td>
<td>British victory, half of Hyderabad acquired by other local powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France vs. Haiti</td>
<td>1791-1804</td>
<td>Haitian independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austro-Hapsburg empire, Britain, Prussia, Russian empire and Spain vs. France (First Coalition 1792-1797, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Coalitions 1799-1814, Waterloo 1815)</td>
<td>1792-1815</td>
<td>British and anti-French coalition victory, US acquires Louisiana territory, British world hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma vs. Thailand</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (1810-1818), Chile (1810-1826), Mexico (1811-1824), Peru (1811-1824), Venezuela (1811-1823) vs. Spain</td>
<td>1810-1824</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian empire vs. Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>Russian victory, colonization of Poland by Austro-Hapsburg Empire, Prussia and Russian Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma vs. Thailand</td>
<td>1797</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma vs. Thailand</td>
<td>1803-1812</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain vs. Marathan empire (Second Marathan War)</td>
<td>1803-1805</td>
<td>British victory, acquisition of Delhi and other territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian (Qajar) empire vs. Russian</td>
<td>1804-1813</td>
<td>Russian victory, limited territorial gains</td>
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<tr>
<td>empire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottoman empire vs. Russian empire</td>
<td>1806-1812</td>
<td>Russian victory, limited territorial gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian empire vs. Sweden</td>
<td>1808-1809</td>
<td>Russian victory, acquisition of Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain vs. United States</td>
<td>1812-1814</td>
<td>Draw</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1. On April 19, 1777, Thomas Paine observed: “Truly we may say, that never did men grow old in so short a time! We have crowded the business of an age into the compass of a few months, and have been driven through such a rapid succession of things, that for the want of leisure to think, we unavoidably wasted knowledge as we came, and have left nearly as much behind us as we brought with us: but the road is yet rich with the fragments, and, before we finally lose sight of them, will repay us for the trouble of stopping to pick them up.” Thomas Paine. “The American Crisis III.” The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine. Edited by Philip S. Foner. New York: Citadel Press, 1945 (74).

2. In 1775, just eleven super-empires – the Austrian, English, Dutch, French, Ottoman, Marathan, Moghul, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian and Qing empires – controlled somewhere between three-fifths to two-thirds of the planet's population.

3. Paul Gilroy's The Black Atlantic (1995) and Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker's The Many-Headed Hydra (2000) provide a wealth of documentation as to how these alliances became the crucial motor of the Atlantic revolutions.

4. Consider the complex and sophisticated mobilization of class, race, gender, urban crowds and preexisting institutions of colonial governance by the Colombian insurgents: “At 11 o'clock in the morning a criollo (native) went to the Spaniard Jose Gonzalez Llorente's shop, situated on the Calle Real (Carrera 7a, No. 394, where during the festivities of the First Centenary of the Independence a commemorative white-marble plate was placed) to borrow a flower vase to adorn the table at a luncheon that was to be given in honor of Don Antonio Villavicencio. The chapeton Llorente (the natives contemptuously applied the term chapeton to all Spaniards), who hated the Americans, said something offensive against them; whereupon Don Francisco and Don Antonia Marales, who were present, fell upon him to punish him. Several passers-by crowded at the door of the shop, yelling and threatening. The news spread quickly; people met in groups, soon swelled by many marketers from the main plaza, it being Friday, which was market day; and the populace began the cry of 'Down with the chapetones'.

   Night added to the excitement. The church bells rang the fire-alarm, which brought to the scene the inhabitants of the farthest parts of the city; and the people, armed with steel weapons, rushed to the viceroy's palace, on the northwestern corner of the plaza (now plaza de Bolivar), asking for a public session of the 'cabildo' (town council), where all those wishing to defend their rights might speak. Viceroy Amar, terrified by the situation, granted only an extraordinary session of the cabildo, presided over by Oidor (Judge of the Royal Audience) Don Juan Jurado. The people then invaded the town hall at the opposite end of the plaza, end, overruling the Spanish officials, started the desired public session.

   The intelligent patriots that directed the revolution took advantage of the enthusiasm of the people, and, assuming that some of the army would not oppose them, decided that the cabildo should proceed to form a governing board (junta). After an excited discussion, which was prolonged until late at night, the cabildo approved the creation of the board, and its members were elected by the popular acclamation of 10,000 participants.” Jorge Posada Callejas. The Blue Book of Colombia: Abridged History of the Republic. New York: J. J. Little & Ives, 1918 (12-13). https://archive.org/details/libroazuldecolom00posa

5. “Education should not be left to the caprice of negligence of parents, of chance, or confined to the children of wealthy citizens; it is a shame, a scandal to civilized society, that part only of the citizens should be sent to colleges and universities to learn to cheat the rest of their liberties. Are ye aware,
legislators, that in making knowledge necessary to the subsistence of your subjects, ye are in duty bound to secure to them the means of acquiring it? Else what is the bond of society but a rope of sand, incapable of supporting its own weight? A heterogenous jumble of contradiction and absurdity, from which the subject knows not how to extricate himself, but often falls victim to his natural wants or to cruel and inexorable laws – starves or is hanged.” Robert Coram. Political Inquiries, to Which is Added, a General Plan for the Establishment of Schools Throughout the United States. Wilmington: Andrews and Brynberg, 1791 (57-58).

6. This and all subsequent population figures for this period are taken from the US Census Bureau's Z19 report. https://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/00165897ch01.pdf.

7. These figures are is based on the first US national census from 1790. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1790_United_States_Census.

8. In the period following the Haitian revolution, the Caribbean plantocracies veered sharply towards political revanchism. As early as 1775 the southern plantocracy had begun to display that characteristic combination of underinvestment in manufacturing and overinvestment in the fields of ideology and military organization, cf. Thomas Jefferson's rhetorical and polemical brilliance and George Washington's generalship, which would culminate in the US Civil War.

9. “Interestingly, Rhode Island – where the slave trade had reached new heights and where smuggling was probably more developed than in all of North America – reacted most strongly to this incident and, thus, could fairly be considered the actual cradle of revolt against the Crown, more than Boston or Lexington or Massachusetts as a whole. Apparently His Majesty Himself took a personal interest in this case, and he may have been rattled by the fact that the decision was made to try the defendants in London precisely because it was felt that no Rhode Island jury would convict the defendants. It was this incident that led directly to the formation of the Committees of Correspondence and the Continental Congress.” Gerald Horne. The Counter-revolution of 1776: Slave Resistance and the Origins of the United States of America. New York: New York University Press, 2014 (205).

10. This choice of venue was rich in geopolitical irony. Charles Coulombe describes the genesis of the building: “On his profits from the Triangle Trade, the Huguenot merchant Peter Faneuil built Faneuil Hall in 1742 and gave it to the people of Boston. More than a marketplace, its halls also served (and still do) as the headquarters of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company and as the location of the Boston Town Meeting (until that body's abolition in 1830). As a backdrop for many political meetings during the decade leading up to the American Revolution, Faneuil Hall has won the nickname 'Cradle of Liberty'. But the origins of the money that paid for it have led to a popular saying of the time: 'the Cradle of Liberty rocks on the bones of the Middle Passage'.” Charles A Coulombe. Rum: The Epic Story of the Drink That Conquered the World. (61). For details on Faneuil Hall's importance as a site of revolutionary mobilization, see: https://www.bostonteapartyship.com/faneuil-hall.


13. The remaining three Intolerable Acts included Massachusetts Government Act abolished Massachusetts' charter, designated most positions in the colonial government as appointees of the British crown, Parliament or the state governor, and restricted Massachusetts town meetings to one per year. The Administration of Justice Act permitted the governor to move trials of accused royal officials to Britain, while the Quartering Act permitted the governor to house soldiers in otherwise unused buildings if the colonial legislatures did not provide facilities.


15. In fairness to Paine, the experience of the anti-colonial war and the French revolution would radicalize him. As early as 1776, he began to search for a concept of solidarity which is beyond land profiteering: “These are the times that try men’s souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis,” he writes, “shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now [italics in original], deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives every thing its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should not be highly rated.” Thomas Paine. The American Crisis. December 23, 1776. http://www.ushistory.org/paine/crisis/c-01.htm.


20. There are intriguing albeit limited parallels to the manner in which the defeat of US neocolonialism in Vietnam was one of the factors enabling the rise of the Global Minotaur in the early 1970s. The insupportable economic and political costs of waging patently neocolonial wars against anti-colonial national revolutions forced US elites to switch from direct neocolonial occupations to indirect neoliberal financializations, or put more bluntly, to switch from tanks to banks. The heroism of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was replaced by the consumerism of Ho Chi Minh City, and US military bases were replaced by the branch plants of transnational corporations seeking to employ Vietnamese workers to produce consumer goods for world markets.


24. In addition to these states, Congress passed the Residence Act creating the District of Columbia on July 16, 1790, and formally established the district on February 27, 1801. As of 2017, the District remains a Congressional territory and not a state, though the District is currently allowed one electoral vote for elections to the national Congress and President.


28. This strategic alliance is embodied in the Carpenter's Hall of Philadelphia. This building was constructed by local carpenters' guild, and served as the meeting-place of the Committees of Correspondence in 1773 and the Continental Congress in 1774. It was also the site of Benjamin Franklin's secret meetings with emissaries of the French monarchy in late 1775, a crucial step in acquiring French diplomatic support for the revolution. Last but not least, this building was the site of the library of the Continental Congress, making it the official predecessor of today's Library of Congress. [http://www.carpentershall.org/history/timeline.htm](http://www.carpentershall.org/history/timeline.htm).

29. The limits of Paine's denunciation are set by the land expansionism of the northern merchant elites: “What should be done with those who are enslaved already? To turn the old and infirm free, would be injustice and cruelty; they who enjoyed the labours of their better days should keep, and treat them humanely. As to the rest, let prudent men, with the assistance of legislatures, determine what is practicable for masters, and best for them. Perhaps some could give them lands upon reasonable rent, some, employing them in their labour still, might give them some reasonable allowances for it; so as all may have some property, and fruits of their labours at the own disposal, and be encouraged to industry; the family may live together, and enjoy the natural satisfaction of exercising relative affections and duties, with civil protection, and other advantages, like fellow men. Perhaps they might sometime form useful barrier settlements on the frontiers. Thus they may become interested in the public welfare, and assist in promoting it; instead of being dangerous, as now they are, should any enemy promise them a better condition.” Thomas Paine (1775). “African Slavery In America.” *Pennsylvania Journal and the Weekly Advertiser*. March 8, 1775. [http://www.constitution.org/tp/afri.htm](http://www.constitution.org/tp/afri.htm).

30. Faced with shortages of regular soldiers to wage the revolutionary war, the Continental Congress recruited an estimated 5,000 African American soldiers to fight for the revolutionary cause between 1776 and 1783, including a unit from French-controlled Saint Domingue (Haiti). The British occupation forces attempted significant political restrictions on wageless labor on the national level.
Similarly, the British occupation authorities employed abolitionism as a tactical weapon against the American revolutionaries. Various military British expeditions marginally disrupted parts of the southern economy, e.g. approximately 25,000 wageless laborers in South Carolina, about 30% of the future state's enslaved population, either escaped from bondage or perished during the revolutionary war. However, both sides left the bulk of the plantation economy untouched. As a result, British policy ended up deepening popular support for independence among the southern planters. See: Peter Kolchin. *American Slavery: 1619–1877.* New York: Hill and Wang, 1994 (73). Also see: Sidney Kaplan and Emma Nogrady Kaplan. *The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolution.* Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989 (64-69).


32. “With the Commonwealth bereft of a central administration, the Sejm itself had perforce to fill that role. Operating for the first time in living memory in untrammelled freedom, it demonstrated a striking capacity to take decisions first and attend to their consequences later. On 20 October 1788, it decreed the expansion of the army from 18,000 to 100,000 men; on 26 March 1789 it resolved a ten per cent tax on revenues to pay for it; from July 1789, it embarked on a programme of secularisation of episcopal estates; in November 1789, it created a new system of local administration in the shape of civil-military commissions of the peace (komisje porządkowe cywilno-wojskowe). In December 1789, the Sejm endorsed a set of Principles for the Reform of the Form of Government, guidelines which mapped out directions for future change. When, in October 1790, it had become depressingly clear how much remained to be done, the Sejm resolved that fresh sejmiki would go ahead in November, with the new complement of envoys to sit alongside the old one.

No one had expected anything like this. The electorate was both fascinated and horrified. Not a single major enactment, with the exception of the destruction of the Permanent Council, not even the genuinely popular expansion of the army to 100,000, had received any endorsement from the 1788 sejmiki. This parliament, passing law on an unprecedented scale, prolonging its own lifespan, seemed to be hurtling out of control. In an explosion of polemic and theorising, envoys and senators sought to explain and justify their conduct and propagate their ideas. There was no question of censorship. Jan Potocki’s ostentatiously named ‘Free Printing-Press’ (Drukarnia Wolna) served only to provide an additional and very necessary facility: ‘...the freedom of the press, to the glory and honour of our nation, has assumed such proportions, that the printers can barely satisfy the urgent zeal of our citizens.’

The turbulence was compounded by news of events in France and the growing and unprecedented engagement of Warsaw’s townsfolk in the discussions. The most authoritative study of this literature puts the number of formal tracts and treatises produced during the lifetime of the Sejm at between 600 and 700, ranging from a few to over a hundred pages in length. That is apart from repeat editions and from the separate and abundant printed and handwritten copies of speeches, epistles and flysheets of all kinds. The most popular writings could boast print-runs exceeding 5,000. ‘Almost everyone reaching for the pen had ambitions of reforming the Commonwealth.’ In Warsaw at least, something like a genuine public sphere was forming.” Jerzy Lukowski. *Disorderly Liberty: The political culture of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century.* London: Continuum, 2010 (174).

34. “Franklin did not publicly speak out against slavery until very late in his life. As a young man he owned slaves, and he carried advertisements for the sale of slaves in his newspaper, the Pennsylvania Gazette. At the same time, however, he published numerous Quaker pamphlets against slavery and condemned the practice of slavery in his private correspondence. It was after the ratification of the United States Constitution that he became an outspoken opponent of slavery. In 1789 he wrote and published several essays supporting the abolition of slavery and his last public act was to send to Congress a petition on behalf of the Society asking for the abolition of slavery and an end to the slave trade. The petition, signed on February 3, 1790, asked the first Congress, then meeting in New York City, to ‘devise means for removing the Inconsistency from the Character of the American People,’ and to ‘promote mercy and justice toward this distressed Race.’

The petition was introduced to the House on February 12 and to the Senate on February 15, 1790. It was immediately denounced by pro-slavery congressmen and sparked a heated debate in both the House and the Senate. The Senate took no action on the petition, and the House referred it to a select committee for further consideration. The committee reported on March 5, 1790 claiming that the Constitution restrains Congress from prohibiting the importation or emancipation of slaves until 1808 and then tabled the petition. On April 17, 1790, just two months later, Franklin died in Philadelphia at the age of 84.”

https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/franklin


36. “Cornwallis’s ban becomes that much more significant in the annals of abolitionism because it appears to have been part of a more comprehensive attack on the institution of slavery itself in India. Less than two weeks after issuing his proclamation, Cornwallis informed the court of directors in London that he was considering a plan to abolish slavery, apparently by a process of gradual emancipation, throughout the company's Indian territories. Unfortunately, no copy of his plan survives in the archival record, and the origins and depth of his abolitionist sentiment remain hidden from our view. What is clear is that the governor-general acted during a period of intense agitation in Britain (1788-92) to abolish the British slave trade, a fact that raises the question whether Cornwallis’s actions were a response to metropolitan political pressure or an attempt to influence the outcome of the growing debate at home about abolishing the slave trade, or both.” Richard B. Allen. “Chapter 10: Slave Trading, Abolitionism, and 'New Systems of Slavery' in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Ocean World.” In: Indian Ocean Slavery in the Age of Abolition. Edited by Richard W. Harms, Bernard K. Freamon, David W. Blight. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013 (242).


40. Rosen 272.

41. Rosen 256.

43. This is data from the Clio Infra database maintained by the International Institute of Social History (IISH) in partnership with the University of Groeningen, the University of Tübingen and the University of Utrecht: [https://www.clio-infra.eu/](https://www.clio-infra.eu/)


45. Rodger 310.

46. Rodger 483.


49. Rodger 414.

50. Thanks to French military assistance, exiled members of the Patriots created the Batavian Republic in 1795. While nominally independent, the republic was under unofficial French military control thereafter. The last shreds of nominal independence disappeared in 1806, when Napoleon appointed his brother Louis to be King of Holland. Following Napoleon's defeat, the Dutch empire became a constitutional monarchy under William Frederick in 1813.

51. “From late 1789 – spurred by the National Assembly’s explicit permission in December for ‘citoyens actifs’ (those men with sufficient property for voting rights) to participate – clubs moved from the periphery to near the centre of Revolutionary politics. By the end of 1790 over 300 such societies were established, the number climbing to over 1,200 by late 1791, and cresting at 3,500 in the Year II [i.e. 1794].” Micah Alpaugh (2014). “The British Origins of the French Jacobins: Radical Sociability and the Development of Political Club Networks, 1787-1793.” *European History Quarterly* 44:4 (601).


56. The original French reads: “Dès ce moment jusqu’à celui où les ennemis auront été chassés du territoire de la République, tous les Français sont en réquisition permanente pour le service des armées. Les jeunes gens iront au combat; les hommes mariés forgeront les armes et transporteront les subsistances; les femmes feront des tentes et serviront dans les hôpitaux; les enfants mettront le vieux R en charpie; les vieillards se feront porter sur les places publiques pour exciter le courage des guerriers, prêcher la haine des rois et l’unité de la République.” http://ahrf.revues.org/1385#bodyftn15.

57. To give readers a sense of the scale of this repression, given that France's population at the time was about 29 million, this is the numerical equivalent of 187,000 executions and 770,000 to 3.3 million arrests in the contemporary United States.


63. White 230.


66. The industrial dynast would reappear in the 19th century in the form of the neo-Bonapartist despot, ranging from Haiti's Jean Boyer to France's second Napoleon, and from Egypt's Muhammed Ali to Mexico's Porfirio Diaz. In the early to mid-20th century, the industrial dynast is relevant to everything from the autocratic modernization projects of the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban one-party states to the predatory despotisms of German, Italian and Japanese fascism. In the late 20th century, the variants of the industrial dynast include the Central and South American caudillos to the postcolonial despotisms of Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan. The latest and final appearance of the industrial dynast were the Presidential monaracies of the energy-rent economies of post-1970 northern Africa and Eurasia, e.g. Aliev's Azerbaijan, military-run Algeria, Sunni-run Bahrain, Mubarak's Egypt, Kuwait, Qaddafi's Libya, Pahlavi and Khomeinist Iran, Baathist Iraq, monarchical Saudi Arabia, Assadist Syria, the UAE, Yeltsinist and Putinist Russia, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

68. Angus Maddison estimated Britain's per capita GDP reached $1,706 in 1820, while the French equivalent was only $1,135. The Netherlands was still the wealthiest nation on earth, with a per capita GDP of $1,838. Maddison's data on historical GDP, revised and supplemented by the efforts of numerous other researchers, is available online: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm

69. This saying is widely misattributed to Talleyrand, but was most likely the creation of French royalist journalist Jacques Mallet du Pan, who was himself paraphrasing French naval officer Charles Louis Etienne. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Mallet_du_Pan. Also see: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Charles_Maurice_de_Talleyrand-P%C3%A9rigord. Du Pan is also famous for his 1793 essay “Considerations on the Nature of the Revolution of France”, the first commentary to describe the French revolution as a Saturn which devoured its own children.

70. Napoleon's original text: “Soldats, l'Europe a les yeux sur vous! Vous avez de grandes destinées à remplir, des batailles à livrer, des dangers, des fatigues à vaincre; vous ferez plus que vous n'avez fait pour la prospérité de la patrie, le bonheur des hommes et votre propre gloire.

Soldats, matelots, fantassins, canonniers, cavaliers, soyez unis. Souvenez-vous que, le jour d'une bataille, vous avez besoin les uns des autres.

Soldats, matelots, vous avez été jusqu'ici négligés; aujourd'hui la plus grande solicitude de la République est pour vous; vous serez dignes de l'armée dont vous faites partie.

Le genie de la liberté, qui a rendu, des sa naissance, la République l'arbitre de L'Europe, veut qu'elle le soit des mers et des nations les plus lointaines.” Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoléon, recueil par ordre chronologique de ses lettres, proclamations, bulletins, discours sur les matières civiles et politiques etc. formant une histoire de son règne. [Napoleon, collection by chronological order of his letters, proclamations, bulletins, speeches on civil and political matters etc. forming a history of his reign.] Paris: Chez Firmin Didot Frères, 1853 (181).

71. The Napoleonic column consisted of a narrow column of skirmishers designed to punch through a small section of the enemy front line. In theory, massed French artillery fire would pin down the enemy, allowing cavalry units to ride into the resulting gap and turn the flanks of the enemy's line. In practice, the front ranks of these columns took hideous losses, but the tactic was often successful due to the fact that French soldiers fought with the fervor of a citizen army. From 1799 until the peak of his power in 1807, these tactics defeated a number of continental European armies. After 1808, however, the very success of weaponization proved to be its undoing. The same French nationalism which gave Napoleon an unbeatable army inexorably alienated all other European powers. The anti-Napoleonic states quietly adopted Napoleon's military innovations, while mobilizing ever bigger coalitions in order to counter French demographics. As the size of armies steadily increased, the battles of movement turned into grinding battles of attrition, neutralizing France's battlefield advantage.


78. There is a more distant but still relevant parallel to be drawn between Haiti’s epic thirteen year struggle for independence against French royalists (1792-1793), against the Spanish and British empires (1793-1798), and finally against the Napoleonic empire (1802-1804), and the twenty-five year struggle of Vietnam for national independence against Japanese and French imperialism (1945), French neocolonialism (1945-1954), and finally US neocolonialism (1954-1975).


83. Samuel Coleridge (1798). The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. Lines 190-194 describe her as a deity of disease:

Her lips were red, her looks were free,
Her locks were yellow as gold:
Her skin was as white as leprosy,
The Nightmare Life-in-Death was she,
Who thicks man's blood with cold.

The body count is related by lines 217-220:

Four times fifty living men
(And I heard nor sigh nor groan),
With heavy thump, a lifeless lump,
They dropp'd down one by one.

84. Coleridge, *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*. Lines 623 to 626:

He went like one that hath been stunn'd,
And is of sense forlorn:
A sadder and a wiser man
He rose the morrow morn.


86. The Spanish empire would reconquer San Domingo in 1809, only to lose it again to Haiti in 1822. When the Dominican Republic declared its independence from Spain in 1844, Haiti launched unsuccessful invasions of its neighbor in 1844, 1845, 1849, 1853 and 1855-1856. Wracked by internal political turmoil, the Dominican Republic returned to Spanish colonial status from 1861 until 1865, before Dominicans fought a successful war of independence between 1863 and 1865. Making amends for its past invasions, Haiti provided crucial assistance for the Dominicans during this war.

87. While Boyer's tenure did witness the long-delayed transformation of a sharecropping economy into a peasant subsistence economy, his achievement of full diplomatic recognition by France in 1825 came at the horrendous price of a 150 million franc indemnity (later reduced to a still-onerous 90 million in 1838), condemning Haiti to decades of neocolonial immiseration. Haiti was thus the earliest example of the combination of postcolonial autocracy and economic neocolonialism which became the norm in the newly independent South American nation-states.


90. “Taking place halfway between the expedition to Egypt (1798-1801) and the aborted invasion of England (1803-1805), the expedition was the most notable of the Consulate. No less than 32 vaisseaux and 22 frigates arrived in Saint-Domingue in the spring of 1802, or two thirds of the French navy. Sending reinforcements and protecting the coast of Saint-Domingue would keep one third of the French Navy employed over the next eighteen months, at a time when France was also readying expeditions to take over Guadeloupe, Louisiana, Reunion, Pondicherry, Mauritius, and Martinique. And yet, by 1804, Saint-Domingue had declared its independence, marking the first major defeat of the Consulate and the only example of a successful slave revolt in world history.” Philippe R. Girard (2010). “The Ugly Duckling: The French Navy and the Saint-Domingue Expedition, 1801-1803.” *International Journal of Naval History*. December 1, 2010.


93. Girard, “The Ugly Duckling.”

94. The truest aspect of this artificial coronation was Jacques-Louis David's invention of the genre of the industrial dynast painting, in his *Consecration of the Emperor Napoleon I and Coronation of the Empress Josephine* (1808) – the template for all future industrial dynasts.

95. Goya's *The Disasters of War* were created between 1810 and 1820, but were based on the events of the Peninsular War.

96. In Chapter 5, we will see how the US adopted a strikingly similar tactical compromise as part of its post-WW II hegemony, by taking a neutral to mildly supportive position vis-a-vis the anti-colonial mass movements of the 1940s and 1950s. This support was qualified, to be sure, by various Cold War interventions and neocolonial proxy wars in the postcolonial nations, but nowhere did the post-1945 US ever attempt to reinstate the former colonial empires.

97. While the British and US planters would continue to wield significant political power until the mid-19th century, in the form of the British parliamentary seats held by magnates who made their fortunes in the West Indies and in the Congressional representatives and successive Presidencies controlled by planters from the southern US states, they were increasingly on the cultural and economic defensive against their competitors.


107. Rodger 422.

108. While the financial records remain incomplete and fragmentary, the consensus of the historians is that Dutch elites purchased roughly one quarter of all British public debt between 1737 and 1774. See: Elize S. Brezis (1995). “Foreign capital flows in the century of Britain's industrial revolution: new estimates, controlled conjectures.” Economic History Review XLVIII:1 (54). After 1789, significant amounts of capital fled the European continent in order to escape French levies and Napoleonic taxation, as well as to earn a secure return in Britain's fast-growing economy.


110. “British manufacturers spun about 5.2 million pounds of cotton in 1781, only about two and a half times as much as they had spun eighty-four years earlier. But a mere nine years later in 1790, that figure had multiplied six times. In 1800, the quantity had nearly doubled again to 56 million pounds. In France,
growth was slower but nonetheless remarkable: in 1789, 4.3 times more cotton was consumed than in 1750, 11 million pounds.” Sven Beckert. *Empire of Cotton: A Global History*. New York: Random House, 2015 (86).

111. We will see in a future chapter how this history would repeat itself in the third supercycle, in the form of the structural complementarity of the Soviet and US empires in 1945.

112. As a consolation prize, Sweden acquired Norway from Denmark in 1814. However, Russia's victory forever removed Sweden from the ranks of potential world empires.


114. These latter regions had the advantage of centuries of economic trade and cultural links with Central European, Hanseatic and Swedish markets. As a result, the Russian empire in both its Romanov and later Soviet forms would be characterized by a Russophone imperial elite ruling over an array of politically subaltern but culturally semi-autonomous non-Russian ethnicities. We will analyze the post-1815 trajectory of the Russian empire more closely in our future essay on the British long peace of 1815-1914.
